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The price of anarchy (PoA) is a standard measure to quantify the inefficiency of equilibria in
congestion games. Recent papers have shown empirically and analytically that the PoA actually
converges to 1 with growing total demand in non-atomic congestion games for a large class
of cost functions that includes all polynomials. This might be a special feature of non-atomic
congestion games since they have a much simpler structure than arbitrary (atomic) congestion
games, which may have pure Nash equilibria with different cost or even no pure Nash equilibrium
at all. We develop in this paper a similar—though more involved—convergence analysis for
atomic congestion games. We view them as transportation networks in which each user (player)
wants to transport a certain unsplittable demand of a good and then investigate the convergence
of the PoA for growing total transport demand. Our analysis covers the PoA for both, pure and
mixed, Nash equilibria. We call the ratio of the worst-case cost of pure Nash equilibria (if it
exist) over the socially optimal cost the atomic PoA, call the ratio of the worst-case expected
cost of mixed Nash equilibria over the socially optimal cost the mixed PoA, and call the ratio of
the random cost of a mixed Nash equilibrium over the socially optimal cost the random PoA
of that mixed Nash equilibrium. We show that the respective PoAs converge to 1 (with high
probability for the random PoA), when the cost functions are arbitrary polynomials and the
maximum individual demand over all users is bounded. We also show by examples that the
latter condition cannot be relaxed. Our results constitute the first convergence analysis for the
PoA in atomic congestion games and show that selfish behavior is well justified when the total
demand is large.
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1 Introduction
The price of anarchy (PoA) is a classical topic in algorithmic game theory and has been investigated
intensively during the last two decades in both atomic and non-atomic congestion games, starting
with the pioneering paper of [37] on the PoA of pure Nash equilibria in non-atomic congestion games
with affine linear cost functions. Much of this work has been devoted to worst-case upper bounds of
the PoA for different types of cost functions τa(·), and the influence of the network topology on this
bound, see, e.g., [26] for an overview.
Much less attention has been paid to the evolution of the PoA as a function of the growing total
demand, although this is quite important for traffic and transportation networks. Only recently, it
has been shown empirically ( [24,28,44]) and analytically ( [6–8,43]) for non-atomic congestion games
that the PoA actually converges to 1 with growing total demand for a large class of cost functions
that includes all polynomials ( [43]).
In this paper, we study this evolution of the PoA for atomic congestion games. While our results
hold for arbitrary atomic congestion games, we will mostly use transportation networks as prototype
atomic congestion games, in which each user (player) wants to transport a certain unsplittable demand
of a good along a path in a network. We then investigate the convergence of the PoA for growing total
(transport) demand T .
Our analysis covers the PoA for both, pure and mixed, Nash equilibria. We call the ratio of the
worst-case cost of pure Nash equilibria (if it exist) over the socially optimal cost the atomic PoA, call
the ratio of the worst-case expected cost of mixed Nash equilibria over the socially optimal cost the
mixed PoA, and call the ratio of the random cost of a mixed Nash equilibrium over the socially optimal
cost the random PoA of that mixed Nash equilibrium. These three PoAs quantify the inefficiency of
pure Nash equilibria, the expected inefficiency of mixed Nash equilibria, and the random inefficiency
of a mixed Nash equilibrium, respectively.
We show that the respective PoAs converge to 1 (with high probability for the random PoA) as
the total demand grows to ∞, when the cost functions are arbitrary polynomials and the maximum
individual demand dmax over all users is bounded. We also show by examples that the latter condition
cannot be relaxed.
To obtain these results, we consider first cost functions that are polynomials of the same degree,
see Section 3. We show that the atomic PoA is 1 + O( 1T ) + O(
d
1/2
max
T 1/2
) + O(dmaxT ) and the mixed
PoA is 1 + O( 1T ) + O(
d
1/3
max
T 1/3
) + O(d
1/6
max
T 1/6
). In particular, we explore the probability distribution of the
random PoA of an arbitrary mixed Nash equilibrium in this case, and show that the random PoA
is 1 + O( 1T ) + O(
d
1/3
max
T 1/3
) + O(d
1/6
max
T 1/6
) with a probability of at least 1 − O(d1/3max
T 1/3
), which guarantees the
efficiency of an arbitrary mixed Nash equilibrium from a probabilistic perspective.
The analysis of the PoA for polynomials with different degrees is much more involved and requires
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a decomposition technique that first analyzes subgames of the given game with a “similar” growth
rate of their total demands and then combine the results for these subgames to derive the convergence
of the PoA for the full game, see Section 4. This leads to essentially the same convergence results, but
with more involved proofs and without an explicit convergence rate.
Altogether, this paper presents the first convergence analysis of the atomic and mixed PoAs and
the first probabilistic analysis of the random PoA for atomic congestion games. Our results show
for atomic congestion games with a large total demand that their pure Nash equilibria, their mixed
Nash equilibria and their social optima are almost equally efficient, and even as efficient as the social
optima of the non-atomic congestion games that correspond to them. In the context of transportation
networks, this means that the selfish choice of both pure and mixed strategies leads to an almost
optimal behavior when the total transport demand is large, and so the selfish behavior is well justified.
Users may then restrict themselves only to pure strategies and need not consider mixed strategies, as
this may not only simplify their decisions, but also save their own cost and the total cost of the whole
network.
1.1 Related work
The existence of equilibria in atomic congestion games was obtained in, e.g., [13–15,32] and others. [32]
showed that an arbitrary unweighted atomic congestion game has a pure Nash equilibrium. [13] showed
for an arbitrary weighted atomic congestion game Γ that if the cost functions of Γ are affine linear,
then Γ is a potential game ( [23]), and thus has a pure Nash equilibrium. Moreover, [15] proved that
if C is a class of cost functions such that every weighted atomic congestion game Γ with cost functions
in C is a potential game, then C contains only affine linear functions. The existence of pure Nash
equilibria in weighted atomic congestion games was further studied by [14]. Beyond these cases, we
have to consider mixed Nash equilibria in atomic congestion games, as [25] showed that every finite
game has a mixed Nash equilibrium.
[20] proposed to quantify the inefficiency of equilibria in arbitrary congestion games from a worst-
case perspective. This resulted in the concept of the price of anarchy (PoA) that is usually defined
as the ratio of the worst-case cost of (pure or mixed) Nash equilibria over the socially optimal cost,
see [29].
A wave of research has been started with the pioneering paper of [37] on the PoA of pure Nash
equilibria in non-atomic congestion games with affine linear cost functions. Examples are [5, 10, 11,
31,33–38] and others. They investigated the worst-case upper bound of the PoA for different types of
cost functions τa(·), and analyzed the influence of the network topology on this bound. They showed
for non-atomic congestion games that this upper bound is 43 for affine linear cost functions ( [37]),
and is Θ( βlnβ ) for polynomial cost functions of degrees at most β ( [38]). For (unweighted) atomic
congestion games, [5] showed that this upper bound is 52 for affine linear cost functions, and is β
Θ(β)
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for polynomial cost functions of degree at most β. Moreover, they showed that these upper bounds
are independent of the network topology, see, e.g., [34]. They also developed a (λ, µ)-smooth method
by which one can obtain a tight and robust worst-case upper bound, see, e.g., [34, 36]. This method
was then reproved by [11] from a geometric perspective. Besides, [31] generalized the analysis to
non-atomic congestion games with non-separable, asymmetric and nonlinear cost functions.
[6–8] were the first to consider the convergence of the PoA for growing total demand. [6–8] showed
for non-atomic congestion games with mutually comparable regularly varying ( [2]) cost functions that
the PoA of pure Nash equilibria converges to 1 as the total demand tends to ∞ when the demands
of all origin-destination pairs grow to ∞ at the same rate. Moreover, they obtained a convergence
rate of O( 1T ) of the PoA for polynomial cost functions in this case. In addition, they also provided an
example showing that the PoA in non-atomic congestion games need not converge to 1 when the cost
functions are not regularly varying.
[43] extended the study of [6–8] and showed for non-atomic congestion games with arbitrary
regularly varying cost functions that the PoA of pure Nash equilibria converges to 1 as the total
demand tends to ∞ regardless of the growth pattern of the demands. So the selfish choice of pure
strategies in non-atomic congestion games need not be bad when the total demand gets large. In
particular, they proved a convergence rate of O( 1
Tβ
) for the PoA in non-atomic congestion games with
BPR cost functions of degree β and illustrated by examples that a conjecture proposed by [28] need
not hold.
[42] extended the techniques of [43] and developed a sensitivity analysis of the PoA of pure Nash
equilibria in non-atomic congestion games. They defined a metric ||Γ1,Γ2|| for two arbitrary non-
atomic congestion games Γ1 and Γ2 and showed under mild conditions that |ρnat(Γ1) − ρnat(Γ2)| ∈
O(
√||Γ1,Γ2||), where ρnat(Γi) denotes the PoA of the non-atomic congestion game Γi, i = 1, 2.
Conditions implying the convergence of mixed Nash equilibria in atomic congestion games to pure
Nash equilibria in non-atomic congestion games were studied in, e.g., [9, 16, 18, 19, 21], and others.
Among these papers, [9] is the closest to our work. [9] showed that mixed Nash equilibria of an atomic
congestion game having cost functions with positive first-order derivatives converge in distribution to
pure Nash equilibria of a limit non-atomic congestion game, when the total demand T converges to a
constant T0 ∈ (0,∞), the maximum individual demand dmax converges to 0, and the number of users
converges to ∞.
1.2 Our contribution
We consider atomic congestion games with unsplittable demands and polynomial cost functions, and
investigate the inefficiency of both pure and mixed Nash equilibria. When pure Nash equilibria exist,
then we call the ratio of the worst-case cost of pure Nash equilibria over the socially optimal cost
the atomic PoA, see (2.6). Moreover, we call the ratio of the worst-case expected cost of mixed Nash
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equilibria over the socially optimal cost the mixed PoA, see (2.8). In addition, we call the ratio of
the random cost of a mixed Nash equilibrium over the socially optimal cost the random PoA of that
mixed Nash equilibrium, see (2.9). These PoAs are significantly different, see Example 2.1.
We then first derive upper bounds of the above three PoAs for polynomial cost functions of the
same degree (which covers BPR cost functions defined in [3]). In this analysis, we apply the technique
of scaling that was used implicitly in [7] and formalized and extended in [43].
Using this technique we show that the atomic PoA is 1 +O( 1T ) +O(
√
dmax
T ) +O(
dmax
T ) when pure
Nash equilibria exist, see Theorem 3.1. Here, T is the total demand and dmax is themaximum individual
demand. Moreover, we show that the mixed PoA is 1+O( 1T )+O(
d
1/3
max
T 1/3
)+O(d
1/6
max
T 1/6
), see Theorem 3.2a),
and that the random PoA of an arbitrary mixed Nash equilibrium is 1 + O( 1T ) + O(
d
1/3
max
T 1/3
) + O(d
1/6
max
T 1/6
)
with an overwhelming probability of 1 − O(d1/3max
T 1/3
), see Theorem 3.2b). Clearly, these upper bounds
decay quickly to 1 as T →∞ and dmaxT → 0. Besides, we illustrate that both conditions T →∞ and
dmax
T → 0 are necessary for the convergence in this case, see Examples 3.1 and 3.2.
We then investigate conditions for the convergence of the atomic PoA and the mixed PoA in atomic
congestion games with arbitrary polynomial cost functions, respectively. We demonstrate first that
the conditions T → ∞ and dmaxT → 0 are no longer sufficient for the convergence of the atomic PoA
to 1, since the cost functions may have different degrees and the (transport) origin-destination pairs
may have asynchronous demand growth rates. This can result in significantly discrepant influences of
the origin-destination pairs on the limits of the PoAs, see Example 4.1.
To capture these possibly discrepant influences, we employ the asymptotic decomposition technique
introduced by [43] and show that both the atomic PoA and the mixed PoA converge to 1 as T →∞,
when the maximum individual demand dmax is bounded from above by a constant independent of the
total demand T , see Theorem 4.1a)–b). Theorem 4.1c) then shows that this convergence holds also
for the worst-case ratio of the total cost of the expected flow of a mixed Nash equilibrium over the
socially optimal cost.
Since the maximum individual demand dmax is likely to be bounded in practice, these convergence
results, together with the studies of [6–8, 43], imply for atomic congestion games with a large total
demand T that their pure Nash equilibria, their mixed Nash equilibria and their social optima are
almost equally efficient, and even as efficient as the social optima of the corresponding non-atomic
congestion games, see (4.2)–(4.5). Thus, both pure Nash equilibria and mixed Nash equilibria in an
atomic congestion game with a large total demand need not be bad. The selfish choice of strategies
may lead to the equally optimal behavior, regardless of whether users employ mixed or pure strategies,
and whether their transport demands are splittable or not.
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1.3 Outline of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. We develop our results for arbitrary atomic congestion games.
These and their relevant concepts are introduced in Section 2 . Section 3 presents our analysis and
results for polynomial cost functions with the same degree. Section 4 then presents our analysis and
results for arbitrary polynomial cost functions. We conclude with a short summary and discussion in
Section 5. To improve readability, all proofs have been moved to an Appendix.
2 Model and Preliminaries
Our study involves both atomic and non-atomic congestion games. To facilitate the discussion, we
introduce a unified notation in Section 2.1 below, and distinguish games implicitly by properties of
their strategy profiles, respectively, see Section 2.2 below.
2.1 Representation
We define an arbitrary congestion game with the nomenclature of transportation games (see, e.g.,
[26, 37]), since this is more intuitive and closer to practice. A congestion game Γ is thus associated
with a transportation network G = (V,A) in our study, and consists of a tuple (K,P, τ,U , d) with
components defined in (G1)–(G5) below.
(G1) K is a finite non-empty set of user groups. Each group k ∈ K corresponds to a (transport)
origin-destination (O/D) pair (ok, tk) in the network G. We will write a group k ∈ K as a pair
(ok, tk) ∈ V × V when its origin ok and destination tk are specified.
(G2) P = ⋃k∈K Pk with each Pk ⊆ 2A \{∅} denotes a non-empty collection of paths that are available
only to users of group k ∈ K. Here, each path is a non-empty subset of the arc set A of G, which
need not be connected. Moreover, Pk
⋂Pk′ = ∅ for all k, k′ ∈ K with k 6= k′.
(G3) τ = (τa)a∈A is a vector of cost functions such that each τa : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is non-negative,
continuous and non-decreasing, denoting the flow-dependent latency or cost of arc a ∈ A.
(G4) U = ⋃k∈K Uk is the collection of all users in Γ. Each Uk is a finite non-empty subset of U
containing all users of group k ∈ K. We assume that Uk ∩ Uk′ = ∅ for any two k, k′ ∈ K with
k 6= k′, i.e., different groups consist of different users.
(G5) d = (dk,i)k∈K,i∈Uk is a real-valued vector whose component dk,i > 0 denotes the demand to be
transported by user i ∈ Uk. So Γ has the total (transport) demand T (U , d) :=
∑
k∈K dk, where
dk :=
∑
i∈Uk dk,i is the total demand of group k ∈ K. We call d = (dk,i)k∈K,i∈Uk the user demand
vector of Γ. Moreover, we denote by dmax := maxi∈Uk,k∈K dk,i the maximum individual demand
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of Γ. Note that Γ is weighted if dk,i ≡ υ for all k ∈ K and all i ∈∈ Uk, for a constant υ > 0.
Otherwise, Γ is unweighted.
The tuple (K,P) together with the transportation network G constitutes the combinatorial struc-
ture of Γ. For ease of notation, we may fix an arbitrary network G and an arbitrary tuple (K,P),
and denote a congestion game Γ simply by the triple (τ,U , d). Viewed as a general congestion game,
the arcs a ∈ A and paths p ∈ P correspond to resources and (pure) strategies, see, e.g., [32] for the
standard definition of congestion games. Although we chose to use the nomenclature of transporta-
tion networks G, the analysis and results are independent of this view and carry over to arbitrary
congestion games.
2.2 Atomic, non-atomic and mixed profiles
We introduce below a joint notation to express the different types of profiles and to cover also profiles
in non-atomic congestion games.
Users distribute their demands simultaneously and independently on paths in P. Their joint
decisions together form a strategy profile or simply profile that is represented by a vector Π =
(Πi)i∈Uk ,k∈K = (Πi,p)i∈Uk ,p∈Pk,k∈K with components satisfying condition (2.1) below,
∑
p′∈Pk
Πi,p′ = 1 and Πi,p ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Uk ∀p ∈ Pk ∀k ∈ K. (2.1)
In the sequel, we employ the convention that Πi,p = 0 for an arbitrary user i ∈ Uk and an arbitrary
path p ∈ Pk′ with k, k′ ∈ K and k 6= k′. So a profile Π can also be identified as a vector (Πi,p)i∈U ,p∈P
with components Πi,p satisfying the condition (2.1).
We call a profile Π atomic if Π is binary, i.e., Πi,p ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ Uk, all p ∈ Pk, and all
k ∈ K. Then every component Πi,p indicates whether path p is used by user i, i.e., Πi,p = 1, or not,
i.e., Πi,p = 0. Observe that every user in Uk uses only paths in Pk, for each k ∈ K. Condition (2.1)
then means that each user i ∈ Uk of an arbitrary group k ∈ K satisfies his demand dk,i in an atomic
profile Π by a single path p ∈ Pk. So a congestion game Γ = (τ,U , d) with only atomic profiles is an
atomic congestion game whose users cannot split their demands dk,i.
Users may split their demands dk,i arbitrarily in non-atomic congestion game, i.e., each user i
of each group k ∈ K can partition his demand dk,i among several paths in Pk. This is captured by
non-atomic profiles. The components Πi,p of a non-atomic profile Π are thus fractions of demand dk,i
deposited by user i ∈ Uk on path p ∈ Pk, i.e., components Πi,p of a non-atomic profile Π can take any
value in [0, 1]. Condition (2.1) is then a feasibility constraint for non-atomic profiles that ensures that
all demands are satisfied.
Clearly, an atomic profile is a particular non-atomic profile, while the converse need not hold.
Nevertheless, both of them are pure (strategy) profiles in their respective games.
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In a mixed profile Π, each Πi = (Πi,p)p∈Pk is a probability distribution over the set Pk for all
i ∈ Uk and all k ∈ K. Then the decisions of users are randomized and each component Πi,p denotes
the probability that user i ∈ Uk uses path p ∈ Pk. Condition (2.1) then means that every user i ∈ Uk
delivers his demand on a single randomly chosen path sampled from the distribution Πi = (Πi,p)p∈Pk .
Clearly, an atomic profile is also a particular mixed profile.
2.3 Multi-commodity flows and cost
A profile Π induces a multi-commodity flow f = (fp)p∈P = (fp)p∈Pk ,k∈K. When Π is atomic or non-
atomic, then f is deterministic with flow value fp :=
∑
i∈Uk dk,i ·Πi,p for all p ∈ Pk and all k ∈ K. We
then call f atomic and non-atomic, respectively. There are only finitely many atomic flows, as the
number |U| =∑k∈K |Uk| of users is finite and user demands dk,i cannot be split.
When Π is mixed, then the flow f is a random vector and the random flow values fp have the
expectation and variance given in (2.2),
EΠ(fp) =
∑
i∈Uk
dk,i ·Πi,p and VARΠ(fp) =
∑
i∈Uk
d2k,i · Πi,p · (1−Πi,p) ∀p ∈ Pk ∀k ∈ K. (2.2)
Recall that users choose their paths mutually independently, that every user i ∈ Uk transports its
demand dk,i entirely on a single random path pk,i(Πi) ∈ Pk sampled from distribution Πi, and that
the random flow value
fp :=
∑
i∈Uk
dk,i · 1{p}
(
pk,i(Πi)
) ∀p ∈ Pk ∀k ∈ K,
where 1B(x) is the indicator function of the membership relation “x ∈ B”. We write EΠ(f) :=(
EΠ(fp)
)
p∈P and call EΠ(f) and f = (fp)p∈P the expected flow and the random flow of the mixed
profile Π, respectively.
The expected flow EΠ(f) is a non-atomic flow, and an arbitrary non-atomic flow is the expected
flow of a mixed profile. Moreover, an atomic flow f is a particular random flow, in which the random
flow values fp have a variance of zero. Note that each state of a random flow of a mixed profile
is an atomic flow, and the finite set of all atomic flows is the state space of all random flows, i.e.,∑
f ′ is an atomic flow PΠ[f = f
′] = 1 for any mixed profile Π with random flow f .
An arbitrary flow f induces an arc flow (fa)a∈A in which component fa :=
∑
p∈P:a∈p fp denotes
the resulting flow value on arc a ∈ A. When Π is atomic or non-atomic, then the arc flow value fa is
again deterministic for all a ∈ A. When Π is mixed, then each fa is random, and has the expectation
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and variance in (2.3) below,
EΠ(fa) =
∑
k∈K
∑
p∈Pk:a∈p
EΠ(fp) =
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Uk
dk,i ·
∑
p∈Pk:a∈p
Πi,p :=
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Uk
dk,i ·Πi,a,
VARΠ(fa) =
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Uk
d2k,i · Πi,a · (1−Πi,a).
(2.3)
Here, Πi,a :=
∑
p∈P:a∈pΠi,p ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability that user i uses arc a ∈ A in the mixed
profile Π. Then (2.3) follows since users use arc a ∈ A mutually independently, and only if arc a belongs
to one of their random paths pk,i(Πi).
For a non-atomic flow, we need only to specify the group demand vector (dk)k∈K, since user
demands dk,i are arbitrarily splittable, and two congestion games have the same set of non-atomic
flows if and only if they have the same group demand vector (dk)k∈K. Nonetheless, the user demand
vector d = (dk,i)k∈K,i∈Uk needs to be specified for atomic and random flows, as the user demands dk,i
can then be not split.
An arbitrary flow f incurs the cost τa(fa) for an arc a ∈ A, and the cost
τp(f) :=
∑
a∈A:a∈p
τa(fa)
for a path p ∈ P. When f is atomic or non-atomic, then these cost are deterministic. Every user
i ∈ Uk then has the deterministic cost
Ck,i(f, τ,U , d) :=
∑
p∈Pk
dk,i · Πi,p · τp(f),
and all users together have the (deterministic) total cost
C(f, τ,U , d) :=
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Uk
Ck,i(f, τ,U , d).
The cost Ck,i(f, τ,U , d) can be expressed equivalently as Ck,i(f, τ,U , d) = dk,i · τpk,i(f)(f) when f is
atomic and pk,i(f) ∈ Pk denotes the path of user i w.r.t. the atomic flow f.Moreover, the deterministic
total cost can be written alternatively as
C(f, τ,U , d) =
∑
p∈P
fp · τp(f) =
∑
a∈A
fa · τa(fa),
since the strategy sets are non-overlapping, i.e., Pk ∩ Pk′ = ∅ for all k, k′ ∈ K with k 6= k′.
The cost values τa(fa) and τp(f) are random depend on the mixed profile Π when f is random
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with mixed profile Π. Then each user i ∈ Uk has the random cost
Cran,k,i(f, τ,U , d) := dk,i · τpk,i(Πi)(f) =
∑
p∈Pk
dk,i · 1{p}(pk,i(Πi)) · τp(f),
where pk,i(Πi) denotes again the random path of user i ∈ Uk. The random total cost is then
Cran(f, τ,U , d) :=
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Uk
Cran,k,i(f, τ,U , d).
Consequently, all users together have expected total cost
EΠ[Cran(f, τ,U , d)] =
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Uk
EΠ[Cran,k,i(f, τ,U , d)] =
∑
a∈A
EΠ
[
fa · τa(fa)
]
=
∑
p∈P
EΠ
[
fp · τp(f)
]
.
The expected total cost EΠ[Cran(f, τ,U , d)] of the random flow f need not equal the total cost
C(EΠ(f), τ,U , d) of the expected flow EΠ(f). But they coincide when Π is atomic.
In the sequel, we denote atomic, non-atomic and random flows by fat = (fat,p)p∈P , fnat =
(fnat,p)p∈P and fran = (fran,p)p∈P , respectively, and will not refer explicitly to the corresponding
profiles since they are clear from the context.
2.4 Social optima and equilibria
Consider an arbitrary congestion game Γ. An atomic flow f∗at is an atomic system optimum (SO), if
C(f∗at, τ,U , d) ≤ C(fat, τ,U , d) for every atomic flow fat. Similarly, a non-atomic flow f∗nat is a non-
atomic SO if C(f∗nat, τ,U , d) ≤ C(fnat, τ,U , d) for every non-atomic flow fnat, and a random flow f∗ran
is a mixed SO if EΠ∗ [Cran(f
∗
ran, τ, U , d)] ≤ EΠ[Cran(fran, τ,U , d)] for each random flow fran, where Π∗
and Π are the respective mixed profiles.
The expected total cost of an arbitrary mixed SO flow coincides with the total cost of an arbitrary
atomic SO flow, since the set of atomic flows is the state space of random flows and every atomic flow
is a random flow with zero variance. Moreover, the total cost of an atomic SO flow is not smaller than
that of a non-atomic SO flow, since every atomic SO flow is also a non-atomic flow. We summarize
this in Lemma 2.1.
Lemma 2.1. Consider an arbitrary congestion game Γ = (τ,U , d) with an arbitrary mixed SO flow
f∗ran, an arbitrary atomic SO flow f∗at, and an arbitrary non-atomic SO flow f∗nat. Then we have
EΠ∗ [Cran(f
∗
ran, τ,U , d)] = C(f∗at, τ,U , d) ≥ C(f∗nat, τ,U , d), where Π∗ is the mixed profile of f∗ran.
An atomic flow f˜at = (f˜at,p)p∈P is an atomic (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE), if no user can benefit
by unilaterally changing his path, i.e.,
Ck,i(f˜at, τ,U , d) = dk,i · τpk,i(f˜at)(f˜at) ≤ Ck,i(f
′
at, , τ,U , d) = dk,i · τp′(f ′at)
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for all k ∈ K, all i ∈ Uk and all p′ ∈ Pk, where pk,i(f˜at) is the path used by user i ∈ Uk w.r.t. atomic
flow f˜at, and f
′
at = (f
′
at,p)p∈P is an atomic flow with components f ′at,p defined in (2.4).
f ′at,p =


f˜at,p if p /∈ {pk,i(f˜at), p′},
f˜at,p − dk,i if p = pk,i(f˜at),
f˜at,p + dk,i if p = p
′,
∀p ∈ P. (2.4)
Clearly, f ′at is the atomic flow obtained by moving user i from path pk,i(f˜at) to path p′ in the atomic
flow f˜at, and so differs only slightly from f˜at when the maximum individual demand dmax is tiny.
As cost functions τa(·) are non-decreasing, non-negative and continuous, non-atomic (pure) NE are
identical with Wardrop equilibria ( [41]), see, e.g., [1, 37]. Thus a non-atomic flow f˜nat = (f˜nat,p)p∈P
is a non-atomic NE if it fulfills Wardrop’s first principle, i.e., τp
(
f˜nat
) ≤ τp′(f˜nat) for any two paths
p, p′ ∈ Pk with f˜nat,p > 0 for each k ∈ K. So a path p ∈ Pk is used, i.e., f˜nat,p > 0, in a non-atomic
NE flow f˜nat only if τp
(
f˜nat
)
= minp′∈Pk τp′
(
f˜nat
)
.
A random flow f˜ran is a mixed NE flow if EΠ˜
[
τp(f˜ran)
] ≤ EΠ˜[τp′(f˜ran)] for any two p, p′ ∈ Pk
with expected path flow value EΠ˜(f˜ran,p) > 0 for all k ∈ K, where Π˜ is the mixed profile of f˜ran, see
also [9]. Since dk,i > 0 for all i ∈ Uk and all k ∈ K, we obtain by (2.2) that the expected flow value
EΠ˜(f˜ran,p) is positive if and only if Π˜i,p > 0 for some user i ∈ Uk. In other words, EΠ˜(f˜ran,p) = 0 if
and only if the random event “f˜ran,p = 0” occurs almost surely, i.e., PΠ˜(f˜ran,p = 0) = 1. Note that the
expected flow EΠ˜(f˜ran) =
(
EΠ˜(f˜ran,p)
)
p∈P of the mixed NE flow f˜ran need not be a non-atomic NE
flow, since EΠ˜
(
τp(f˜ran)
)
need not equal τp
(
EΠ˜(f˜ran)
)
for paths p ∈ P.
Moreover, an atomic NE flow f˜at need not be a mixed NE flow, although f˜at is a special random
flow with zero variance. An atomic flow fat is a mixed NE flow if and only if it is a non-atomic NE
flow, i.e., if it fulfills Wardrop’s first principle.
Example 2.1 below demonstrates the mutual relationships among atomic, non-atomic and mixed
NE flows. It shows in particular that the set of atomic NE flows need not intersect the set of non-
atomic NE flows, and neither need the set of atomic NE flows intersect the set of mixed NE flows.
Example 2.1 illustrates also that the set of expected flows of mixed NE flows need not intersect the
set of non-atomic NE flows.
Example 2.1. Consider the simple congestion game Γ with one O/D pair (o, t) (i.e., K = {1}) and
two parallel paths (arcs) shown in Figure 1 below. We label the upper and the lower arcs as u and l,
respectively. Γ has cost functions τu(x) = x
2 and τl(x) ≡ 2, and two users with O/D pair (o, t) and
demand 2 each. Then Γ has a unique atomic NE flow f˜at = (f˜at,u, f˜at,l) = (0, 4), since a user using
the upper arc u has a cost of at least 4 > τl(x) ≡ 2 and can always benefit by moving to the lower arc l.
Moreover, Γ has the unique non-atomic NE flow f˜nat = (
√
2, 4−√2), since demands in a non-atomic
flow can be arbitrarily split, and a non-atomic NE flow fulfills Wardrop’s first principle. So the sets
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o t
x2
2
Figure 1: An example of atomic, non-atomic, and mixed NE flows
of atomic and non-atomic NE flows of Γ do not overlap.
Let f˜ran = (f˜ran,u, f˜ran,l) be an arbitrary mixed NE flow with mixed profile Π˜ = (Π˜1, Π˜2) =
(Π˜1,u, Π˜1,l, Π˜2,u, Π˜2,l). We label the two users of Γ as 1 and 2, respectively. Then
EΠ˜
[
τu(f˜ran)
]
= EΠ˜
[
τu(f˜ran,u)
]
= EΠ˜
[
f˜2ran,u
]
= EΠ˜
[(
2 · 1{u}
(
p1,1(Π˜1)
)
+ 2 · 1{u}
(
p1,2(Π˜2)
))2]
= 4 · Π˜1,u + 4 · Π˜2,u + 8 · Π˜1,u · Π˜2,u
and EΠ˜
[
τl(f˜ran)
]
= EΠ˜
[
τl(f˜ran,l)
] ≡ 2, where we recall that p1,1(Π˜1) and p1,2(Π˜2) are random paths
used by users 1 and 2, respectively, and that Γ has only one O/D pair (o, t).
Since f˜ran is a mixed NE flow, Π˜1,u, Π˜2,u ∈ [0, 1) and 2 > Π˜1,u + Π˜2,u > 0. Otherwise, either
EΠ˜
[
τu(f˜ran)
] ≥ 4 > EΠ˜[τl(f˜ran)] (when Π˜1,u = 1 or Π˜2,u = 1), or EΠ˜[τu(f˜ran)] = 0 < EΠ˜[τl(f˜ran)]
(when Π˜1,u = Π˜2,u = 0). So the expected flow values are EΠ˜(f˜ran,u) = 2 · (Π˜1,u + Π˜2,u) > 0 and
EΠ˜(f˜ran,l) = 4− 2 · (Π˜1,u + Π˜2,u) > 0. Thus we obtain that
EΠ˜
[
τu(f˜ran)
]
= 4 · Π˜1,u + 4 · Π˜2,u + 8 · Π˜1,u · Π2,u = 2 = EΠ˜
[
τl(f˜ran)
]
. (2.5)
Therefore, the set of mixed NE flows of Γ does not contain the unique atomic NE flow f˜at. More-
over, the expected flow EΠ˜(f˜ran) of an arbitrary mixed NE flow f˜ran does not coincide with the unique
non-atomic NE flow f˜nat = (
√
2, 4−√2) of Γ. Otherwise EΠ˜(f˜ran,u) = 2·(Π˜1,u+Π˜2,u) =
√
2 = f˜nat,u >
0, but EΠ˜
[
τu(f˜ran)
] ≥ 4 · Π˜1,u + 4 · Π˜2,u = 2 · √2 > 2 = EΠ˜[τl(f˜ran)], which conflicts with (2.5).
Lemma 2.2 below summarizes known conditions for the existence of NE flows. Non-atomic and
mixed NE flows always exist, while atomic NE flows need not exist when the congestion game is
weighted, i.e., when some individual user demands dk,i differ.
Lemma 2.2. Consider an arbitrary congestion game Γ. Then the following hold.
a) (See, e.g., [14, 15, 32]) If Γ is weighted, then Γ need not have an atomic NE flow. If Γ is
unweighted, then Γ has atomic NE flows, but these atomic NE flows may have different total
cost.
b) (See, e.g., [12, 37, 40]) Γ has a non-atomic NE flow. Moreover, every non-atomic NE flow has
the same arc cost, and so the same total cost, i.e., τa(f˜nat,a) = τa(f˜
′
nat,a) for every arc a ∈ A
and every two non-atomic NE flows fnat, f
′
nat of Γ.
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c) (Variational inequality characterization, see, e.g., [12,31,39]) A non-atomic flow f˜nat is a non-
atomic NE flow if and only if the variational inequality
∑
a∈A τa
(
f˜nat,a
) · (fnat,a − f˜nat,a) ≥ 0
holds for each non-atomic flow fnat of Γ.
d) (See, e.g., [25]) Γ has a mixed NE flow f˜ran.
Lemma 2.2c) characterizes non-atomic NE flows with a variational inequality that was used to
define non-atomic NE flows in, e.g., [12,31]. We will see in Section 3 below that this characterization
helps to bound the total cost of atomic NE flows and the expected total cost of mixed NE flows.
2.5 The price of anarchy
[20] proposed to quantify the inefficiency of equilibria from a worst-case perspective, which then
resulted in the notion of Price of Anarchy (PoA), see [29]. Informally, the PoA is the worst-case ratio
of the total cost of a NE flow over that of an SO flow.
Since we consider non-atomic, atomic and mixed NE flows, we define four PoAs in (2.6)–(2.9),
in which f˜nat, f
∗
nat and f
∗
at are arbitrary non-atomic NE flow, an arbitrary non-atomic SO flow and
an arbitrary atomic SO flow, respectively. We call ρat(τ,U , d) the atomic PoA, ρnat(τ,U , d) the non-
atomic PoA, ρmix(τ,U , d) the mixed PoA, and ρran(f˜ran, τ,U , d) the random PoA of the random mixed
NE flow f˜ran. Here, we use Lemma 2.2b) to show (2.7) and Lemma 2.1 to show (2.8).
ρat(τ,U , d) :=max
{C(f˜at,τ,U ,d)
C(f∗at,τ,U ,d)
: f˜at is an atomic NE flow of Γ
}
, (2.6)
ρnat(τ,U , d) := C(f˜nat, τ,U , d)
C(f∗nat, τ,U , d)
, (2.7)
ρmix(τ,U , d) :=max
{
EΠ˜[Cran(f˜ran,τ,U ,d)]
EΠ∗ [Cran(f∗ran,τ,U ,d)]
: f˜ran, f
∗
ran are mixed NE and SO flows of Γ, resp.
}
,
= max
{
EΠ˜[Cran(f˜ran,τ,U ,d)]
C(f∗at, τ,U , d)
: f˜ran is a mixed NE flow of Γ
}
, (2.8)
ρran(f˜ran, τ,U , d) := Cran(f˜ran, τ,U , d)
C(f∗at, τ,U , d)
, (2.9)
ρran(f˜ran, τ,U , d) differs from ρat(τ,U , d), ρnat(τ,U , d) and ρmix(τ,U , d). Moreover, ρat(τ,U , d),
ρnat(τ,U , d) and ρmix(τ,U , d) may be different, see Example 2.1, in which
ρmix(τ,U , d) ≥ 10 + 40 · Π˜1,u · Π˜2,u
8
≥ 5
4
>
18
18−√6 =ρnat(τ,U , d)>ρat(τ,U , d)=1.
There are cases in which the non-atomic PoA equals 00 , see, e.g., [42]. This happens when some
arc a ∈ A can be used “for free”, i.e., τa(x) = 0 for some x > 0. This may happen also for the atomic,
the mixed and the random PoAs. To avoid this undefined case, we assume that τa(x) > 0 for all x > 0
and all a ∈ A, i.e., any use of an arc a ∈ A must be paid for. Then ρat(τ,U , d), ρmix(τ,U , d) and
ρran(τ,U , d) are well defined and take values in [1,∞].
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3 Upper bounds for the PoAs for polynomial cost functions of the
same degree
In this Section, we consider only polynomial cost functions of the same degree, i.e., functions τa(·) are
of the form (3.1)
τa(x) =
β∑
l=0
ηa,l · xβ−l ∀x ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A, (3.1)
where β ≥ 0 is a non-negative integer denoting the degree of the polynomial τa(·), and ηa,l, l = 0, . . . , β,
are non-negative constant coefficients with ηa,0 > 0. This covers the BPR cost functions that are
frequently used in urban traffic to model travel latency, see [3].
Since there are no free arcs, the coefficient ηa,0 of the term ηa,0 · xβ in (3.1) is positive for all
a ∈ A. So the four PoAs are well defined. This follows from Lemma 2.1 and the fact that the
total cost of a non-atomic SO flow is not smaller than
T (U ,d)β+1·η0,min
|P|β > 0 when T (U , d) > 0, where
η0,min := mina∈A ηa,0 > 0.
3.1 Asymptotic notation
Our analysis below involves standard asymptotic notations O(·), Ω(·), Θ(·), o(·) and ω(·) that are
defined as follows. We write h1(x) ∈ O(h2(x)) or h1(x) = O(h2(x)) for two non-negative real-valued
functions h1(·) and h2(·) if limx→∞ h1(x)h2(x) <∞ or h1(x) ≤ b·h2(x) for all x ≥ 0 and some constant b > 0
independent of x, and h1(x) ∈ o(h2(x)) or h1(x) = o(h2(x)) if limx→∞ h1(x)h2(x) = 0. Conversely, we write
h1(x) ∈ Ω(h2(x)) or h1(x) = Ω(h2(x)) if limx→∞ h1(x)h2(x) > 0 or h1(x) ≥ b · h2(x) for all x ≥ 0 and some
constant b > 0 independent of x, and h1(x) ∈ ω(h2(x)) or h1(x) = ω(h2(x)) if limx→∞ h1(x)h2(x) = ∞.
Moreover, we write h1(x) ∈ Θ(h2(x)) or h1(x) = Θ(h2(x)) if h1(x) ∈ Ω(h2(x)) and h1(x) ∈ O(h2(x)).
These asymptotic notations naturally carry over to sequences of non-negative reals.
3.2 An upper bound for the atomic PoA
Theorem 3.1 shows an upper bound for the atomic PoA in congestion games with polynomial cost
functions of the same degree. It will be proved in Section 3.3 below.
Theorem 3.1. Consider an arbitrary congestion game Γ = (τ,U , d) with cost functions τa(·) of the
form (3.1). If Γ has atomic NE flows, then ρat(τ,U , d) ≤ 1+ β·ηmax·|P|
β
η0,min
·∑βl=1 1T (U ,d)l + |A|·κ·|P|βη0,min ·√
|P| · |A| · κ · dmaxT (U ,d)+ |A|·κ·|P|
β+1
η0,min
· dmaxT (U ,d) , where ηmax := max{ηa,l : a ∈ A, l = 0, . . . , β} and κ :=
β · ηmax ·
(
1 +
∑β
l=1
1
T (U ,d)l
)
> 0. Here, we employ the convention that
∑β
l=1
1
T (U ,d)l = 0 when β = 0.
The upper bound holds for all demand values T (U , d) and dmax, and converges to 1 at a rate of
O( 1T (U ,d)) + O(
√
dmax
T (U ,d)) + O(
dmax
T (U ,d)) as T (U , d) →∞ and dmaxT (U ,d) → 0. So the atomic PoA may decay
to 1 very quickly when Γ has atomic NE flows. This means that pure Nash equilibria need not be bad
for congestion games with polynomial cost functions of the same degree and high total demand.
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Note that the atomic PoA ρat(τ,U , d) need not converge to 1 if the total demand T (U , d) is bounded
from above as dmaxT (U ,d) → 0, see Example 3.1 below.
Example 3.1. Consider a unweighted congestion game Γ with the network of Figure 2 below. Γ has
one O/D pair (o, t) and two parallel arcs (paths) with cost functions x and x+1, respectively. Assume
that Γ has |U| = 4 ·n users with 14·n demand each. Then the total demand T (U , d) ≡ 1 and dmax = 14·n .
Clearly, Γ has only one atomic NE flow f˜at, in which all users use the upper arc. So the total cost of Γ
o t
x
x+ 1
Figure 2: Atomic PoA need not converge to 1 as user number |U| → ∞
is C(f˜at, τ,U , d) = 1 for atomic NE flows. Γ has also a unique atomic SO flow f∗at, in which 3 ·n users
use the upper arc and the remaining n users use the lower arc. Its total cost is C(f∗at, τ,U , d) = 78 ,
and so the atomic PoA of Γ is 87 for all n, which does not converge to 1 when
dmax
T (U ,d) → 0.
Also, ρat(τ,U , d) need not converge to 1 when dmaxT (U ,d) is bounded away from 0 as T (U , d)→∞. We
demonstrate this in Example 3.2 below.
Example 3.2. Consider a unweighted congestion game Γ with the network of Figure 3 below. Γ
has only one O/D pair (o, t) and two parallel arcs (paths) with cost functions x and 2 · x, respectively.
Assume now that there are two users with demand n each. Then the total demand of Γ is T (U , d) = 2·n,
which tends to ∞ as n→∞. However, dmaxT (U ,d) → 12 > 0 as n→∞. Obviously, Γ has only one atomic
o t
x
2 · x
Figure 3: Atomic PoA need not converge to 1 as total demand T (U , d)→∞
SO flow f∗at, in which one user uses the upper arc and the other uses the lower arc. So the total cost
of Γ is 3 · n2 for atomic SO flows. However, Γ has two atomic NE flows. One atomic NE flow is just
the unique SO flow. In the other atomic NE flow, both users use the upper arc, and its total cost is
4 · n2. Consequently, the atomic PoA of Γ is 43 , which does not converge to 1 when the total demand
T (U , d) = 2 · n→∞.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Theorem 3.1 is proved with technique of scaling in [7, 43].
16
3.3.1 Scaled games
Definition 3.1 (Scaled games, [43]). Consider an arbitrary congestion game Γ = (τ,U , d) with arbi-
trary cost functions, and an arbitrary constant g > 0. The scaled game of Γ w.r.t. scaling factor g
is the congestion game Γ[g] =
(
τ [g],U , d¯) whose cost function vector τ [g] := (τ [g]a )a∈A has a component
τ
[g]
a (x) :=
τa(x·T (U ,d))
g for each pair (a, x) ∈ A× [0, 1], and whose user demand vector d¯ = (d¯k,i)i∈Uk ,k∈K
has a component d¯k,i :=
dk,i
T (U ,d) for each user i ∈ Uk and each k ∈ K.
Lemma 3.1 below shows that the scaling does not change the four PoAs, see Appendix A.2 for its
proof. Here, we note that this has already been proposed for the non-atomic PoA implicitly in [7] and
explicitly in [43].
Lemma 3.1. Consider an arbitrary congestion game Γ = (τ,U , d) with arbitrary cost functions, an
arbitrary mixed NE flow f˜ran of Γ, and an arbitrary scaling factor g > 0. Let Γ
[g] = (τ [g],U , d¯) be the
scaled game of Γ with factor g. Then ρat(τ
[g],U , d¯) = ρat(τ,U , d), ρnat(τ [g],U , d¯) = ρnat(τ,U , d), and
ρmix(τ
[g],U , d¯) = ρmix(τ,U , d). Moreover, f˜ranT (U ,d) is a mixed NE flow of the scaled game Γ[g], and so
ρran(
f˜ran
T (U ,d) , τ
[g],U , d¯) = ρran(f˜ran, τ,U , d).
This invariance of the PoAs enables us to prove Theorem 3.1 by bounding the atomic PoA,
ρat(τ
[g],U , d¯), of the scaled game Γ[g] = (τ [g],U , d¯) with a suitable scaling factor g > 0 instead of
proving it for the original game. So we can exploit the advantage that the scaled game Γ[g] has a
constant total demand of T (U , d¯) = 1, and thus we can purely concentrate on the influence of dmaxT (U ,d) .
However, the scaling factor g must be chosen carefully, so as to ensure that the total cost of users
in the resulting scaled game Γ[g] is moderate, i.e., neither too large nor too small. As indicated by [43],
we use g := T (U , d)β as the scaling factor for the congestion game Γ = (τ,U , d) in Theorem 3.1 for
this case of cost functions of the same degree β. Then the scaled game Γ[g] = (τ [g],U , d¯) of Γ has the
scaled cost function
τ [g]a (x) =
∑β
l=0 ηa,l ·
(
T (U , d) · x)β−l
g
= ηa,0 · xβ +
β∑
l=1
ηa,l
T (U , d)l · x
β−l (3.2)
for arc a ∈ A, the bounded demand d¯k,i = dk,iT (U ,d) ≤ dmaxT (U ,d) ∈ [0, 1] for user i ∈ Uk, the bounded demand
d¯k :=
dk
T (U ,d) ∈ [0, 1] for group k ∈ K, and the constant total demand T (U , d¯) = 1.
Consequently, an arbitrary atomic flow f
[g]
at of Γ
[g] has bounded arc flow values f
[g]
at,a ∈ [0, 1] for all
a ∈ A. This boundedness is very helpful when we want to derive an upper bound for the atomic PoA
ρat(τ
[g],U , d¯). In particular, it ensures that the total cost of an arbitrary atomic flow of Γ[g] is in the
interval [
η0,min
|P|β , |A| · ηmax].
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The atomic PoA ρat(τ
[g],U , d¯) of the scaled game Γ[g] fulfills
ρat(τ,U , d) =ρat(τ [g],U , d¯)
≤ρnat(τ [g],U , d¯)+
|max
f˜
[g]
at
C(f˜
[g]
at , τ
[g],U , d¯)−C(f˜ [g]nat, τ [g],U , d¯)|
C(f
∗[g]
nat , τ
[g],U , d¯)
,
(3.3)
where f˜
[g]
nat and f
∗[g]
nat are an arbitrary non-atomic NE flow and an arbitrary non-atomic SO flow of
the scaled game Γ[g], respectively, and the maximization is taken over all atomic NE flows f˜
[g]
at of Γ
[g].
Equation (3.3) follows from (2.6) and Lemma 2.1. In particular, the total cost of an atomic SO flow
is at least as large as that of a non-atomic SO flow.
3.3.2 ǫ-approximate non-atomic NE flow
We now prove Theorem 3.1 with Lemma 3.1 and (3.3) by showing upper bounds for
|max
f˜
[g]
at
C(f˜
[g]
at , τ
[g],U , d¯)− C(f˜ [g]nat, τ [g],U , d¯)| (3.4)
and the non-atomic PoA ρnat(τ
[g],U , d¯) of Γ[g], respectively. Here, we recall that
C(f
∗[g]
nat , τ
[g],U , d¯) ≥ η0,min|P|β > 0
for the scaled game Γ[g].
To obtain an upper bound for (3.4), we will show that an arbitrary atomic NE flow f˜
[g]
at of Γ
[g] is
approximately a non-atomic NE flow of Γ[g] with a gap that can be “well bounded”. To this end, we
need the notion of ǫ-approximate non-atomic NE flow from [42].
Definition 3.2. Consider an arbitrary congestion game Γ = (τ,U , d). We call an arbitrary non-atomic
flow fnat of Γ an ǫ-approximate non-atomic NE flow for a constant ǫ > 0 if
∑
a∈A τa(fnat,a) · (fnat,a−
f ′nat,a) ≤ ǫ for an arbitrary non-atomic flow f ′nat of Γ.
Note that there are alternative definitions for ǫ-approximate non-atomic NE flows, see, e.g., [37].
We stick to Definition 3.2, since it is close to the variational characterization of non-atomic NE flows
in Lemma 2.2c) and thus facilitates the resulting cost comparison between an ǫ-approximate non-
atomic NE flow and a non-atomic NE flow. Using the variational inequalities in Lemma 2.2c) and
Definition 3.2, [42] has shown that the arc cost difference between an ǫ-approximate non-atomic NE
flow and a non-atomic NE flow can be bounded from above by O(
√
ǫ), see Lemma 3.2 below.
Lemma 3.2 ( [42]). Consider an arbitrary congestion game Γ = (τ,U , d) with a total demand of
1 and an arbitrary ǫ-approximate non-atomic NE flow f˜ ǫnat of Γ. If all cost functions are Lipschitz
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bounded on [0, 1] with a constant κ > 0, i.e., |τa(x)− τa(y)| ≤ κ · |x− y| for all (a, x, y) ∈ A× [0, 1]2,
then |τa(f˜nat,a)− τa(f˜ ǫnat,a)| ≤ κ ·
√
ǫ for all a ∈ A for an arbitrary non-atomic NE flow f˜nat of Γ.
We now use Lemma 3.2 to show the upper bound for (3.4) in Lemma 3.3 below. Here, we observe
that the scaled cost functions τ
[g]
a (·) in (3.2) are Lipschitz bounded on [0, 1] with the constant κ defined
in Theorem 3.1. We move the proof of Lemma 3.3 to Appendix A.3.
Lemma 3.3. Consider an arbitrary congestion game Γ as in Theorem 3.1. Let Γ[g] be its scaled
game with factor g = T (U , d)β , and let f˜ [g]at and f˜ [g]nat be an arbitrary atomic NE flow and an arbitrary
non-atomic NE flow of Γ[g], respectively. Then the following statements hold.
a) τ
[g]
p
(
f˜
[g]
at
) ≤ τ [g]p′ (f˜ [g]at ) + |A|·κ·dmaxT (U ,d) for all k ∈ K and all p, p′ ∈ Pk with f [g]at,p > 0, where κ > 0 is
defined in Theorem 3.1.
b) f˜
[g]
at is a
|P|·|A|·κ·dmax
T (U ,d) -approximate non-atomic NE flow of Γ
[g], and so |τ [g]a (f˜ [g]at,a)) − τ [g]a (f˜ [g]nat,a)|
≤ κ ·
√
|P| · |A| · κ · dmaxT (U ,d) for all a ∈ A.
c) |C(f˜ [g]at , τ [g],U , d¯)−C(f˜ [g]nat, τ [g],U , d¯)|≤|A|·κ·
√
|P|·|A|·κ· dmaxT (U ,d)+|P|·|A|·κ· dmaxT (U ,d) .
Lemma 3.4 below shows an upper bound for the non-atomic PoA ρat(τ
[g],U , d¯) and generalizes a
result for BPR functions in [43]. We move the proof to Appendix A.4.
Lemma 3.4. Consider an arbitrary congestion game Γ as in Theorem 3.1. Let Γ[g] be the scaled game
of Γ with factor g = T (U , d)β . Then ρnat(τ,U , d) = ρnat(τ [g],U , d¯) ≤ 1 + β·ηmax·|P|
β
η0,min
·∑βl=1 1T (U ,d)l .
Theorem 3.1 then follows immediately from Lemma 3.1, (3.3), Lemma 3.3c) and Lemma 3.4. This
completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
3.4 Upper bounds for the mixed PoA and the random PoA
Theorem 3.2 below derives similar upper bounds for the mixed PoA and the random PoA. We prove
it in Section 3.5 below.
Theorem 3.2. Consider an arbitrary congestion game Γ = (τ,U , d) such that each τa(·) has the
form (3.1) with degree β ≥ 0 and coefficient ηa,0 > 0. Let f˜ran be an arbitrary mixed NE flow of Γ.
Then the following statements hold.
a) The random event “ρran(f˜ran, τ,U , d) = 1+O( 1T (U ,d)) +O( d
1/3
max
T (U ,d)1/3 ) +O(
d
1/6
max
T (U ,d)1/6 )” occurs with
a probability of at least 1−O( d1/3max
T (U ,d)1/3 ).
b) ρmix(τ,U , d) = 1 +O( 1T (U ,d)) +O( d
1/3
max
T (U ,d)1/3 ) +O(
d
1/6
max
T (U ,d)1/6 ).
We hide the constants of the upper bounds in Theorem 3.2a)–b) in the big O since they are
complicated expressions. Interested readers can find their detailed values in Lemma 3.5 of Section 3.5.
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Theorem 3.2a) implies that the random PoA converges in probability to 1 as T (U , d) → ∞ and
dmax
T (U ,d) → 0. It shows that the random PoA is 1 + O( 1T (U ,d)) + O( d
1/3
max
T (U ,d)1/3 ) + O(
d
1/6
max
T (U ,d)1/6 ) with an
overwhelming probability of 1 − O( d1/3max
T (U ,d)1/3 ). Moreover, Theorem 3.2b) implies that the mixed PoA
also converges to 1 quickly as T (U , d) → ∞ and dmaxT (U ,d) → 0. Therefore, also mixed Nash equilibria
need not be bad for a congestion game with polynomial cost functions of the same degree. They are
good with an overwhelming probability when T (U , d) is large and dmaxT (U ,d) is small.
Note that a recent paper by [9] has already shown that a mixed NE flow of an arbitrary atomic
congestion game converges in distribution to a non-atomic NE flow of a limit non-atomic congestion
game when the total demand T (U , d)→ T0 ∈ (0,∞), the maximum individual demand dmax → 0 and
the number of users |U| → ∞. However, this does not imply Theorem 3.2b), since neither dmax → 0
nor |U| → ∞ need to hold in Theorem 3.2b).
3.5 Proof of Theorem 3.2
We also prove Theorem 3.2a)–b) with the scaled game Γ[g] of Γ defined in Section 3.3 and Lemma 3.1.
We obtain by Lemma 2.1, (2.8) and (2.9) that
ρmix(τ
[g],U , d¯)≤ ρnat(τ [g],U , d¯)+
|max
f˜
[g]
ran
EΠ˜[Cran(f˜
[g]
ran,τ [g],U , d¯)]−C(f˜ [g]nat,τ [g],U , d¯)|
C(f
∗[g]
nat , τ
[g],U , d¯)
, (3.5)
and that
ρran(f˜
[g]
ran, τ
[g],U , d¯) ≤ ρnat(τ [g],U , d¯) + |Cran(f˜
[g]
ran, τ [g],U , d¯)− C(f˜ [g]nat, τ [g],U , d¯)|
C(f
∗[g]
nat , τ
[g],U , d¯)
. (3.6)
Using Lemma 3.4, we now only need to derive upper bounds for the numerators of the two fractions
in (3.5) and (3.6), respectively.
Consider now an arbitrary mixed NE flow f˜
[g]
ran of Γ[g] with a mixed profile Π˜ = (Π˜i)i∈U .
Lemma 3.5a) below shows that the expected flow EΠ˜(f˜
[g]
ran) of f˜
[g]
ran is an ǫ-approximate non-
atomic NE flow with ǫ ∈ O( d1/3max
T (U ,d)1/3 ), and |C(EΠ˜(f˜
[g]
ran), τ [g],U , d¯) − C(f˜ [g]nat, τ [g],U , d¯)| ∈ O( d
1/3
max
T (U ,d)1/3 )
+ O( d
1/6
max
T (U ,d)1/6 ). Lemma 3.5b) shows for each δ ∈ (0, 12) that the random event “|Cran(f˜
[g]
ran, τ [g],U , d¯)
− C(EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran), τ [g],U , d¯)| ∈ O( dδmaxT (U ,d)δ )” occurs with a probability of at least 1−O( d1−2·δmaxT (U ,d)1−2·δ ). These
facts together imply that the random event “|Cran(f˜ [g]ran, τ [g],U , d¯) − C
(
f˜
[g]
nat, τ
[g],U , d¯)| ∈ O( dδmax
T (U ,d)δ )
+ O( d
1/3
max
T (U ,d)1/3 ) + O(
d
1/6
max
T (U ,d)1/6 )” occurs with a probability of at least 1 − O(
d1−2·δmax
T (U ,d)1−2·δ ), which, com-
bined with Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.4, and (3.6), proves Theorem 3.2a) when we put δ = 13 . More-
over, Lemma 3.5c) shows that
∣∣EΠ˜[Cran(f˜ [g]ran, τ [g],U , d¯)] − C(EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran), τ [g],U , d¯)∣∣ ∈ O( d1/3maxT (U ,d)1/3 ).
Then we obtain by Lemma 3.5a) that |EΠ˜[Cran(f˜ [g]ran, τ [g],U , d¯)] − C(f˜ [g]nat, τ [g],U , d¯)| ∈ O( d
1/3
max
T (U ,d)1/3 )
+ O( d
1/6
max
T (U ,d)1/6 ). This, Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.4, and (3.5) imply Theorem 3.2b). We move the detailed
proof of Lemma 3.5 to Appendix A.5.
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Lemma 3.5. Consider the congestion game Γ = (τ,U , d) in Theorem 3.2, and the scaling factor
g = T (U , d)β . Let Γ[g] be the scaled game of Γ with factor g, and let f˜ [g]ran be an arbitrary mixed NE
flow of Γ[g] with mixed profile Π˜. Then the following statements hold.
a) When β > 0, then the expected flow EΠ˜(f˜
[g]
ran) of the mixed profile Π˜ is an ǫ-approximate
non-atomic NE flow with ǫ = 2 · |P| · κ · |A| · (1 + |A|4·β ) · ( dmaxT (U ,d))1/3, and |C(f˜ [g]nat, τ [g],U , d¯) −
C
(
EΠ˜(f˜
[g]
ran), τ [g],U , d¯
)| ≤ |A| · κ ·√2 · |P| · κ · |A| · (1 + |A|4·β ) · ( dmaxT (U ,d))1/3 + 2 · |P| · κ · |A| · (1 +
|A|
4·β
) · ( dmaxT (U ,d))1/3 for an arbitrary non-atomic NE flow f˜ [g]nat of Γ[g]. When β = 0, then EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran)
is a non-atomic NE flow of Γ[g].
b) Consider an arbitrary constant δ ∈ (0, 1/2). The random event “ ∣∣f˜ [g]ran,a−EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran,a)∣∣ ≤ ( dmaxT (U ,d))δ
for all a ∈ A” occurs with a probability of at least 1−Pδ := 1− |A|4 ·
(
dmax
T (U ,d)
)1−2·δ
. Moreover, the
random event “|Cran(f˜ [g]ran, τ [g],U , d¯) − C
(
EΠ˜(f˜
[g]
ran), τ [g],U , d¯
)| ≤ |A| · (κ + ηmax ·∑βl=0 1T (U ,d)l ) ·(
dmax
T (U ,d)
)δ
” occurs with a probability of at least 1−Pδ.
c)
∣∣∣EΠ˜[Cran(f˜ [g]ran, τ [g],U , d¯)] − C(EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran), τ [g],U , d¯)∣∣∣ ≤ |A| · (κ + (1 + |A|4 ) · ηmax ·∑βl=0 1T (U ,d)l ) ·(
dmax
T (U ,d)
)1/3
.
4 A convergence analysis of the price of anarchy for arbitrary poly-
nomial cost functions
We continue now to consider the case of arbitrary polynomial cost functions, i.e., all τa(x) are of the
form
τa(x) =
βa∑
l=0
ηa,l · xβa−l, ∀x ∈ [0,∞), (4.1)
and the non-negative degrees βa need not be the same, i.e., βa 6= βa′ may hold for some arcs a 6= a′.
We assume again that the coefficients ηa,0, . . . , ηa,βa are non-negative with ηa,0 > 0 for all a ∈ A.
For this general case, we will develop a sufficient condition for the convergence of the atomic
PoA and the mixed PoA to 1. Recall that Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 together imply already a sufficient
condition for this convergence for an arbitrary congestion game with polynomial cost functions of the
same degree. This condition simply requires that the total demand T (U , d) → ∞ and dmaxT (U ,d) → 0.
However this condition need not be sufficient for polynomials of different degrees. This can already
be observed for the atomic PoA in Example 4.1.
Example 4.1. Consider a congestion game Γ with the network of Figure 4. Γ has two non-overlapping
O/D pairs (o1, t1) and (o2, t2), and both of them have two parallel arcs. Assume that (o1, t1) has 2 ·
√
n
users with each a demand of
√
n, and that (o2, t2) has 2 users with the same demand of
√
n each. So
Γ is an unweighted congestion game with maximum individual demand dmax =
√
n. Then, as n→∞,
T (U , d) = 2 · n + 2 · √n → ∞ and dmaxT (U ,d) =
√
n
2·n+2·√n → 0. So Γ fulfills the sufficient condition of
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Theorem 3.1. However, the atomic PoA of Γ converges to 169 > 1 as n→∞. This follows since Γ has
o1 t1 o2 t2
x
x
x3
8 · x3 + 1
Figure 4: The PoA need not converge to 1
a worst-case total cost of 2 · n+ 16 · n2 for atomic NE flows, and a total cost of 2 · n+9 · n2 +√n for
atomic SO flows when n is large.
Theorem 4.1 below presents a sufficient condition for the convergence of the atomic PoA and the
mixed PoA in congestion games with arbitrary polynomial cost functions. This condition requires in
addition to the former conditions that the maximum individual demand dmax is bounded, i.e., dmax ≤ υ
for a constant υ > 0 independent of the total demand T (U , d). Example 4.1 has already demonstrated
that this boundedness condition is necessary for the convergence.
Moreover, Theorem 4.1c) shows with this boundedness condition that the worst-case ratio of the
total cost of the expected flow EΠ˜(f˜ran) of a mixed NE flow f˜ran over that of a non-atomic SO flow
f∗nat converges also to 1 as the total demand T (U , d)→∞.
Theorem 4.1. Consider an arbitrary congestion game Γ with cost functions τa(·) defined in (4.1).
Assume that the maximum individual demand dmax of Γ is bounded from above by a constant υ > 0
independent of the total demand T (U , d). Then the following statements hold.
a) If Γ has an atomic NE flow for an arbitrary total demand T (U , d), then ρat(τ,U , d) → 1 as
T (U , d)→∞.
b) ρmix(τ,U , d)→ 1 as T (U , d)→∞.
c)
maxf˜ran C
(
EΠ˜
(
f˜ran
)
,τ,U ,d
)
C(f∗nat,τ,U ,d) → 1 as T (U , d)→∞, where the maximization in the numerator is taken
over all possible mixed NE flows f˜ran of Γ.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is presented in Section 4.1. It bounds again the atomic PoA and the
mixed PoA through the non-atomic PoA, and then show the convergence of the corresponding upper
bounds to 1 by techniques developed by [43]. However, explicit convergence rates for the upper bounds
in this general case remains open since we do not even know an explicit convergence rate for the simpler
non-atomic PoA in this case.
Moreover, we have not been able to show that the random PoA converges in probability to 1 in this
general case, as we see no way to compute the probability when the demands dk of groups k ∈ K grow
asynchronously. However, using Fact A.3 in Appendix A.7, one can obtain a crude lower probability
bound that converges to 1. But this is not central to this paper and thus omitted.
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4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
To simplify the proof, we assume, w.l.o.g., that Γ has atomic NE flows for arbitrary user set U and
arbitrary user demand vector d, and so for arbitrary total demand T (U , d).
We consider an arbitrary sequence (Sn)n∈N, in which each component
Sn :=
(U (n), d(n), f˜ (n)at , f˜ (n)ran, Π˜(n), f˜ (n)nat, f∗(n)nat )
satisfies properties (S1)–(S3) below.
(S1) U (n) = ⋃k∈K U (n)k , where each U (n)k denotes the user set of group k ∈ K, and d(n) = (d(n)k,i )i∈U(n)k ,k∈K
with d
(n)
k,i ∈ (0, υ] denotes the demand of user i ∈ U (n)k . Here, υ > 0 is a finite constant upper
bound of the maximum individual demand d
(n)
max :=
∑
k∈K,i∈U(n)k
d
(n)
k,i , which is independent of
the sequence (Sn)n∈N.
(S2) f˜
(n)
at = (f˜
(n)
at,p)p∈P , f˜
(n)
ran = (f˜
(n)
ran,p)p∈P , f˜
(n)
nat = (f˜
(n)
nat,p)p∈P and f
∗(n)
nat = (f
∗(n)
nat,p)p∈P are an arbitrary
atomic NE flow, an arbitrary mixed NE flow, an arbitrary non-atomic NE flow and an arbitrary
non-atomic SO flow of the game Γ with user set U (n) and user demand vector d(n), respectively.
Moreover, Π˜(n) = (Π˜
(n)
i,p )i∈U(n)k ,p∈Pk,k∈K
is the mixed profile of the mixed NE flow f˜
(n)
ran.
(S3) limn→∞ T (U (n), d(n)) = ∞, where T (U (n), d(n)) =
∑
k∈K d
(n)
k is the total demand of the game Γ
with user set U (n) and user demand vector d(n), and d(n)k =
∑
i∈U(n)k
d
(n)
k,i is the demand of group
k ∈ K.
Due to the arbitrary choice of the sequence (Sn)n∈N, Theorem 4.1a)–c) are then equivalent to
lim
n→∞
C(f˜
(n)
at , τ,U (n), d(n))
C(f
∗(n)
at , τ,U (n), d(n))
= 1, lim
n→∞
C
(
EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran
)
, τ,U (n), d(n)
)
C(f
∗(n)
nat , τ,U (n), d(n))
= 1 and
lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)
[
Cran(f˜
(n)
ran, τ,U (n), d(n))
]
EΠ∗(n)
[
Cran(f
∗(n)
ran , τ,U (n), d(n))
] = lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)
[
Cran(f˜
(n)
ran, τ,U (n), d(n))
]
C(f
∗(n)
at , τ,U (n), d(n))
= 1.
(4.2)
Here, f
∗(n)
at and f
∗(n)
ran are an arbitrary atomic SO flow and an arbitrary mixed SO flow of the game
Γ with user set U (n) and user demand vector d(n), respectively, and Π∗(n) is the mixed profile of the
mixed SO flow f
∗(n)
ran .
[43] have already proved that the non-atomic PoA converges to 1 when the total demand T (U (n), d(n))→
∞, i.e., limn→∞ ρnat(τ,U (n), d(n)) = limn→∞ C(f˜
(n)
nat,τ,U(n),d(n))
C(f
∗(n)
nat ,τ,U(n),d(n))
= 1. Hence, we can obtain (4.2) directly
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with Lemma 2.1, if (4.3) below holds.
lim
n→∞
C(f˜
(n)
at , τ,U (n), d(n))
C(f˜
(n)
nat, τ,U (n), d(n))
= lim
n→∞
C
(
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran), τ,U (n), d(n)
)
C(f˜
(n)
nat, τ,U (n), d(n))
= lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)
[
Cran(f˜
(n)
ran, τ,U (n), d(n))
]
C(f˜
(n)
nat, τ,U (n), d(n))
=1
(4.3)
(4.3) actually means that both, the atomic NE flow f˜
(n)
at and the expected flow EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran) of the
mixed NE flow f˜
(n)
ran, are asymptotically as efficient as the non-atomic NE flow f˜
(n)
nat, and thus almost as
efficient as the non-atomic SO flow f
∗(n)
nat when n is large enough. Moreover, the mixed NE flow f˜
(n)
ran
is also asymptotically as efficient as the non-atomic SO flow f
∗(n)
nat from the perspective of its expected
total cost. Hence, all of these flows, f˜
(n)
at , f
∗(n)
at ,EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran), f˜
(n)
ran, f
∗(n)
ran , f˜
(n)
nat, and f
∗(n)
nat , are almost
equally efficient when the total demand gets large, although they have rather different properties.
To show (4.3), we assume, w.l.o.g., that
(S4) limn→∞ d
(n)
k ∈ [0,∞] and limn→∞
d
(n)
k
d
(n)
k′
∈ [0,∞] exist for all k, k′ ∈ K.
Note that (4.3) holds for an arbitrary sequence (Sn)n∈N satisfying (S1)–(S3) if and only if (4.3) holds
for an arbitrary sequence (Sn)n∈N satisfying (S1)–(S4). This follows since every infinite subsequence
(Snj )j∈N of a sequence (Sn)n∈N satisfying (S1)–(S3) has an infinite subsequence (Snjl )l∈N fulfilling
(S1)–(S4), see [43] for such subsequence arguments.
We now show (4.3) for an arbitrary sequence (Sn)n∈N satisfying (S1)–(S4) with the technique of
asymptotic decomposition developed recently by [43].
Example 4.1 has shown that different groups k ∈ K may have significantly discrepant influences on
the limit of the PoAs, in which O/D pair (o2, t2) dominates completely the limit and O/D pair (o1, t1)
has only a negligible influence on that limit. These discrepant influences are caused by the different
degrees of the polynomial cost functions τa(·) and the asynchronous growth rates of the demands d(n)k
of groups k ∈ K. The asymptotic decomposition technique enables us to capture these discrepant
influences from different groups k ∈ K. It puts groups k ∈ K with a similar influence on the limits
of the PoAs together to form a “subgame”, then analyzes the resulting subgames independently and
combines the results.
4.1.1 Subgames
Definition 4.1 (Subgames). Consider an arbitrary congestion game Γ = (τ,U , d), and an arbitrary
non-empty subset K′ of K. Let U|K′ :=
⋃
k∈K′ Uk and d|K′ := (dk,i)i∈Uk ,k∈K′ denote the restrictions
of user set U and user demand vector d to groups k ∈ K′, respectively. Then the congestion game
(τ,U|K′ , d|K′), denoted by Γ|K′ , is called a subgame of Γ w.r.t. K′.
Consider now an arbitrary congestion game Γ and an arbitrary subgame Γ|K′ of Γ. Let f =
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(fp)p∈P = (fp)p∈Pk,k∈K be an arbitrary flow of Γ. Then the restriction f|K′ = (fp)p∈Pk,k∈K′ of f to
subgame Γ|K′ forms a flow of subgame Γ|K′ .Moreover, f|K′ is atomic if f is atomic, f|K′ is non-atomic if
f is non-atomic, and f|K′ is random if f is random. Furthermore, we denote by fa|K′ =
∑
p∈∪k∈K′Pk fp
the arc flow value induced by flow f|K′ of Γ|K′ on each a ∈ A. Obviously, fa = fa|K′ + fa|K\K′ , and
fa|K′ is just the independent contribution of subgame Γ|K′ to arc flow value fa of flow f.
The independent contribution fa|K′ of subgame Γ|K′ to an arc flow value fa induces the independent
cost on arc a ∈ A, which is exactly the arc cost τa(fa|K′) of arc a ∈ A in the subgame Γ|K′ w.r.t.
the flow f|K′. Note that the joint cost τa(fa) of an arc a ∈ A need not equal τa(fa|K′) + τa(fa|K\K′),
although fa = fa|K′ + fa|K\K′ .
Consequently, subgame Γ|K′ has two types of total cost w.r.t. a flow f of Γ, i.e., the independent
total cost and the joint total cost. The independent total cost equals C(f|K′ , τ,U|K′ , d|K′) =
∑
a∈A fa|K′ ·
τa(fa|K′) =
∑
k∈K′
∑
p∈Pk fp ·τp(f|K′), which is exactly the total cost of flow f|K′ of subgame Γ|K′ , while
the joint total cost equals CK′(f, τ,U , d) :=
∑
k∈K′
∑
p∈Pk fp · τp(f). Obviously, the independent total
cost is not larger than the joint total cost, since the joint total cost considers also the contribution
from the subgame Γ|K\K′ . Thus we have
C(f, τ,U , d) = CK′(f, τ,U , d) +CK\K′(f, τ,U , d)
≥ C(f|K′ , τ,U|K′ , d|K′) + C(f|K\K′ , τ,U|K\K′ , d|K\K′).
Note that the restriction f˜|K′ of an arbitrary (pure or mixed) NE flow f˜ of Γ need not be a (resp.,
pure or mixed) NE flow of the subgame Γ|K′ . This follows since the role of the subgame Γ|K\K′ in the
NE flow f˜ is completely ignored in the subgame Γ|K′ .
4.1.2 Asymptotic decomposition
With the notion of subgames, we can now asymptotically decompose the congestion game Γ in Theo-
rem 4.1 for an arbitrary sequence (Sn)n∈N fulfilling conditions (S1)–(S4) as follows.
We put Kreg := {k ∈ K : limn→∞ d(n)k =∞} and K \ Kreg =: Kirreg. We obtain by (S3)–(S4) that
Kreg 6= ∅. We call groups in Kreg regular, and groups in Kirreg irregular. So irregular groups have a
bounded total demand, while regular groups have an unbounded total demand.
We collect regular groups k ∈ Kreg with an equal demand growth rate into one class, which,
by property (S4), then results in an ordered partition K1 ≺ · · · ≺ Km of Kreg satisfying conditions
(AD1)–(AD2) below.
(AD1) limn→∞
d
(n)
k
d
(n)
k′
∈ (0,∞), i.e., d(n)k ∈ Θ(d(n)k′ ) for all k, k′ ∈ Ku for each u ∈ M := {1, . . . ,m},
(AD2) limn→∞
d
(n)
k
d
(n)
k′
= 0, i.e., d
(n)
k ∈ o(d(n)k′ ) for all k ∈ Ku, k′ ∈ Kl for all u, l ∈ M with l < u.
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Here, m ≥ 1 is an integer, and Kl ≺ Ku means that groups k′ ∈ Kl have demands d(n)k′ converging to
∞ much faster than the demands of k ∈ Ku.
Consequently, Γ is decomposed into subgames Γ|K1 , . . . ,Γ|Km ,Γ|Kirreg for an arbitrary sequence
(Sn)n∈N fulfilling (S1)–(S4). Clearly, each regular subgame Γ|Ku has the user set U (n,Ku) := U (n)|Ku =⋃
k∈Ku U
(n)
k , the user demand vector d
(n,Ku) := d(n)|Ku = (d
(n)
k,i )i∈U(n)k ,k∈Ku
and the total demand T ((n,Ku), d(n,Ku))
=
∑
k∈Ku d
(n)
k that tends to∞ as n→∞. The irregular subgame Γ|Kirreg has the user set U (n,Kirreg) :=
U (n)|Kirreg =
⋃
k∈Kirreg U
(n)
k , the user demand vector d
(n,Kirreg) := d(n)|Kirreg = (d
(n)
k,i )i∈U(n)k ,k∈Kirreg
and the
total demand T (U (n,Kirreg), d(n,Kirreg)) = ∑k∈Kirreg d(n)k that tends to a bounded constant as n → ∞.
Moreover, we obtain by condition (AD2) that
lim
n→∞
T ((n,Ku), d(n,Ku))
T ((n,Kl), d(n,Kl))
= 0 ∀u, l ∈ M with l < u. (4.4)
[43] have shown for this decomposition of non-atomic NE flows that
lim
n→∞
C(f˜
(n)
nat, τ,U (n), d(n))
C(f˜
(n,Kirreg)
nat , τ,U (n,Kirreg), d(n,Kirreg)) +
∑m
l=1C(f˜
(n,Kl)
nat , τ,U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl))
= lim
n→∞
CKirreg(f˜
(n)
nat, τ,U (n), d(n)) +
∑m
l=1CKl(f˜
(n)
nat, τ,U (n), d(n))
C(f˜
(n,Kirreg)
nat , τ,U (n,Kirreg), d(n,Kirreg)) +
∑m
l=1 C(f˜
(n,Kl)
nat , τ,U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl))
= lim
n→∞
∑m
l=1CKl(f˜
(n)
nat, τ,U (n), d(n))∑m
l=1C(f˜
(n,Kl)
nat , τ,U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl))
= 1,
(4.5)
where f˜
(n,Kl)
nat and f˜
(n,Kirreg)
nat denote arbitrary non-atomic NE flows of the regular subgame Γ|Kl and
the irregular subgame Γ|Kirreg , respectively. Here, we recall that CKl(f˜
(n)
nat, τ,U (n), d(n)) is the joint
total cost of the subgame Γ|Kl in the non-atomic NE flow f˜
(n)
nat of Γ. The irregular subgame vanishes in
the limit of (4.5), since it has a bounded total demand, see [43] for details. Lemma 4.1 below shows
results similar to (4.5) for atomic and mixed NE flows. We move the long proof of Lemma 4.1 to
Appendix A.6.
Lemma 4.1. Consider a congestion game Γ = (τ,U , d) with polynomial cost functions τa(·) of the
form (4.1), and an arbitrary sequence (Sn)n∈N fulfilling conditions (S1)–(S4). Let f˜ (n,Kl)nat and f˜ (n,Kirreg)nat
be an arbitrary non-atomic NE flow of the regular subgame Γ|Kl and an arbitrary non-atomic NE flow
of the irregular subgame Γ|Kirreg , respectively, for each l = 1, . . . ,m and each n ∈ N. Then
lim
n→∞
C(f˜
(n)
at , τ,U (n), d(n))
C(f˜
(n,Kirreg)
nat , τ,U (n,Kirreg), d(n,Kirreg)) +
∑m
l=1 C(f˜
(n,Kl)
nat , τ,U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl))
= 1,
lim
n→∞
C
(
EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran
)
, τ,U (n), d(n)
)
C(f˜
(n,Kirreg)
nat , τ,U (n,Kirreg), d(n,Kirreg)) +
∑m
l=1 C(f˜
(n,Kl)
nat , τ,U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl))
= 1,
lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)
[
Cran(f˜
(n)
ran, τ,U (n), d(n))
]
C(f˜
(n,Kirreg)
nat , τ,U (n,Kirreg), d(n,Kirreg)) +
∑m
l=1 C(f˜
(n,Kl)
nat , τ,U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl))
= 1.
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Lemma 4.1 and (4.5) imply (4.3) for an arbitrary sequence (Sn)n∈N fulfilling (S1)–(S4). This in
turn implies (4.2), and then proves Theorem 4.1.
5 Summary
We have studied the inefficiency of both pure Nash equilibria and mixed Nash equilibria in congestion
games with unsplitable demands. When the cost functions are polynomials of the same degree, we
have derived upper bounds for the atomic PoA, the mixed PoA and the random PoA, respectively.
These upper bounds tend to 1 quickly as the total demand T (U , d)→∞ and dmaxT (U ,d) → 0 together. In
particular, they imply that the convergence rates of the PoAs constitute a power law in this case.
When the cost functions are arbitrary polynomials and the maximum individual demand dmax is
bounded, we show that both the mixed PoA and the atomic PoA converge to 1 as the total demand
T (U , d)→∞. Moreover, we illustrate that this need not hold when the maximum individual demand
dmax is unbounded. However, it is still open and challenging to analyze the convergence rates for this
general case.
Our results imply that pure and mixed Nash equilibria in atomic congestion games with a large
total demand need not be bad, since the maximum individual demand is likely to be bounded in
practice. This, together with studies of [6–8] and [43], indicates that the selfish choice of strategies is
quite good in games with a high demand, regardless of whether users choose mixed or pure strategies,
and whether the demand is splittable or not.
An important future research topic is to analyze the convergence rates of the PoAs for arbitrary
polynomial cost functions, which is a crucial step for further bounding the PoAs in a congestion game
with a high demand and arbitrary analytic cost functions. Note that analytic cost functions can be
approximated using polynomials, and that the sensitivity analysis in [42] seemingly indicates that this
approximation for analytic cost functions may also be used for the PoAs.
While pure Nash equilibria need not exist in an arbitrary finite game, [25] has shown that every
finite game has a mixed Nash equilibrium. Since the user choices in a mixed Nash equilibrium is
randomized, the probability distribution of the random PoA might be a more comprehensive measure
for the inefficiency of mixed Nash equilibria. Our analysis of the random PoA for atomic congestion
games with polynomial cost functions of the same degree has already provided the first successful
sample, which may apply also to finite games of other types. Thus another important future research
topic is to generalize such probability distribution analysis of the random PoA to finite games of other
types.
In our study, we have assumed that the cost functions are separable, i.e., each arc a ∈ A has a
cost function depending only on its own flow value fa. However, it may happen also that the cost of
some arc a ∈ A depends not only on fa, but also on flow values fb of other arcs b ∈ A. Then the
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cost functions are called non-separable, see, e.g., [31]. Convergence analysis of the atomic, mixed and
non-atomic PoAs for congestion games with non-separable cost functions would also be an interesting
future research topic, as the worst-case upper bounds of the non-atomic PoA in such games have
already been obtained by [4] and [31].
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A Mathematical Proofs
A.1 Stochastic inequalities
Our proofs will use the Markov’s inequality, the Chebyshev’s inequality and the Jensen’s inequality.
We summarize them in Lemma A.1 below.
Lemma A.1 (See also [22, 30]). Let X be a random variable with E(X) ≥ 0 and let ∆ > 0 be an
arbitrary constant. Then
a) (Markov’s inequality) P(X > ∆) ≤ E(X)∆ .
b) (Chebyshev’s inequality) P(|X − E(X)| > ∆) ≤ VAR(X)
∆2
.
c) (Jensen’s inequality) E(h(X)) ≥ h(E(X)) for every convex function h : R→ R.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.1
We prove the Lemma only for the atomic PoA, the mixed PoA and the random PoA, as [43] have
already shown that for the non-atomic PoA.
Proof for the atomic PoA:
Let f˜
[g]
at = (f˜
[g]
at,p)p∈P be an arbitrary atomic NE flow of the scaled game Γ
[g]. Then f˜
[g]
at · T (U , d) =(
f˜
[g]
at,p · T (U , d)
)
p∈P is an atomic NE flow of Γ, since the users remain the same, d¯k,i =
dk,i
T (U ,d) for all
k ∈ K and i ∈ Uk, and τ [g]p (f˜ [g]at ) =
∑
a∈A:a∈p τ
[g]
a (f˜
[g]
at,a) =
∑
a∈A:a∈p τa(f˜
[g]
at,a·T (U ,d))
g for all p ∈ P.
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Similarly, f˜atT (U ,d) = (
f˜at,p
T (U ,d))p∈P is an atomic NE flow of Γ
[g] if f˜at = (f˜at,p)p∈P is an atomic NE flow
of Γ.
Similar arguments carry over to atomic SO flows. The atomic PoA is thus invariant under scaling,
since
C(f, τ,U , d) = C( f
T (U , d) , τ
[g],U , d¯) · g (A.1)
for an arbitrary flow f of Γ.
Proof for the mixed PoA:
Let f˜
[g]
ran be an arbitrary mixed NE flow of Γ[g] with mixed profile Π˜. Then f˜
[g]
ran ·T (U , d) is a mixed
NE flow of Γ, again with mixed profile Π˜, since EΠ˜(τp(f˜
[g]
ran ·T (U , d))) = EΠ˜(τ [g]p (f˜ [g]ran)) ·g for all p ∈ P.
Similarly, f˜ranT (U ,d) is a mixed NE flow of Γ
[g] if f˜ran is a mixed NE flow of Γ.
Similar arguments carry again over to mixed SO flows. Then the mixed PoA is also invariant
under scaling, which follows from the fact that equation (A.1) still holds if we take expectation w.r.t.
the same mixed profile on both sides of the equation (A.1).
The statement for the random PoA follows similarly. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.1. 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Note that Lemma 3.3 holds trivially if β = 0, since all cost functions τa(·) are then positive constants,
and so the total cost of atomic and non-atomic NE flows coincide. We thus assume that β ≥ 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.3a):
Consider now an arbitrary group k ∈ K and an arbitrary user i ∈ Uk. Lemma 3.3a) follows if
τ
[g]
pk,i(f˜
[g]
at )
(
f˜
[g]
at
) ≤ τ [g]p′ (f˜ [g]at )+ |A| · κ · dmaxT (U , d) (A.2)
for all paths p′ ∈ Pk, where κ is defined in Theorem 3.1 and pk,i(f˜ [g]at ) is the path of user i in the
atomic NE flow f˜
[g]
at .
To prove (A.2), we consider an arbitrary path p′ ∈ Pk. Since f˜ [g]at is an atomic NE flow, we obtain
Ck,i(f˜
[g]
at , τ
[g],U , d¯)= dk,i
T (U , d) · τ
[g]
pk,i(f˜
[g]
at )
(f˜
[g]
at )≤Ck,i(f [g]
′
at , τ
[g],U , d¯)= dk,i
T (U , d) · τ
[g]
p′ (f
[g]′
at ), (A.3)
where f
[g]′
at is an atomic flow of Γ
[g] defined as in (2.4), i.e., f
[g]′
at is the resulting flow obtained by
moving user i from path pk,i(f˜
[g]
at ) to path p
′ in the atomic NE flow f˜ [g]at . (A.3) implies further that
τ
[g]
pk,i(f˜
[g]
at )
(
f˜
[g]
at
)
=
∑
a∈A: a∈pk,i(f˜ [g]at )
τ [g]a
(
f˜
[g]
at,a
) ≤ τ [g]p′ (f [g]′at ) = ∑
a∈A: a∈p′
τ [g]a
(
f
[g]′
at,a
)
.
(A.4)
Note that the atomic flows f˜
[g]
at and f˜
[g]′
at differ only in the choice of user i. Note also that user i
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controls an amount d¯k,i ≤ dmaxT (U ,d) of demand in Γ[g]. So we obtain for all a ∈ A that |f˜
[g]
at,a − f [g]
′
at,a| ≤
d¯k,i ≤ dmaxT (U ,d) , where we recall that user i uses only a single path in any atomic flow. This and (3.2)
imply that
∣∣τ [g]a (f˜ [g]at,a)− τ [g]a (f [g]′at,a)∣∣ ≤ κ · |f˜ [g]at,a − f [g]′at,a| = κ · d¯k,i ≤ κ · dmaxT (U , d) ∀a ∈ A. (A.5)
Here, we used that the scaled cost functions τ
[g]
a (x) are Lipschitz bounded on [0, 1] with constant κ
defined in Theorem 3.1, and that all arc flow values of the scaled game Γ[g] are in [0, 1]. Then (A.5)
and (A.4) imply that τ
[g]
pk,i(f˜
[g]
at )
(
f˜
[g]
at
) ≤ τ [g]p′ (f˜ [g]at )+ |A| ·κ · d¯k,i ≤ τ [g]p′ (f˜ [g]at )+ |A| ·κ · dmaxT (U ,d) , which proves
(A.2) due to arbitrary choice of p′ ∈ Pk. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.3a).
Proof of Lemma 3.3b):
By Lemma 3.3a), an arbitrary atomic NE flow f˜
[g]
at of Γ
[g] satisfies that max
p∈Pk: f˜ [g]at,p>0
τ
[g]
p (f˜
[g]
at )
≤ minp∈Pk τ [g]p (f˜ [g]at ) + |A|·κ·dmaxT (U ,d) for each k ∈ K. This in turn implies for an arbitrary non-atomic flow
f
[g]
nat that
∑
a∈A
τ [g]a
(
f˜
[g]
at,a
) · (f [g]nat,a−f˜ [g]at,a)=∑
p∈P
τ [g]p
(
f˜
[g]
at
) · (f [g]nat,p−f˜ [g]at,p)≥−|P| · |A| · κ · dmaxT (U ,d) . (A.6)
Here, we used that the total demand of Γ[g] is T (U , d¯) = 1, and that
∑
k∈K
∑
p∈Pk
τ
[g]
p∗k
(
f˜
[g]
at
) · (f [g]nat,p − f˜ [g]at,p) =∑
k∈K
τ
[g]
p∗k
(
f˜
[g]
at
) · ∑
p∈Pk
(
f
[g]
nat,p − f˜ [g]at,p
)
= 0,
where p∗k denotes the least costly path in Pk w.r.t. the atomic NE flow f˜ [g]at . By Definition 3.2, f˜ [g]at
is an ǫ-approximate non-atomic NE flow of Γ[g] with ǫ := |P|·|A|·κ·dmaxT (U ,d) , and Lemma 3.3b) then follows
immediately from Lemma 3.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.3c):
Since the arc flow values in the scaled game Γ[g] are in the interval [0, 1], we obtain with(A.6) and
Lemma 3.3b) that
C(f˜
[g]
at , τ
[g],U , d¯)− C(f˜ [g]nat, τ [g],U , d¯)
=
∑
a∈A
τ [g]a (f˜
[g]
at,a) ·
(
f˜
[g]
at,a − f˜ [g]nat,a
)
+
∑
a∈A
(
τ [g]a (f˜
[g]
at,a)− τ [g]a (f˜ [g]nat,a)
) · f˜ [g]nat,a
≤
∑
a∈A
(
τ [g]a (f˜
[g]
at,a)−τ [g]a (f˜ [g]nat,a)
) · f˜ [g]nat,a+ |P|·|A|·κ·dmaxT (U , d)
≤|A|·κ·
√
|P|·|A|·κ·dmax
T (U , d) +
|P|·|A|·κ·dmax
T (U , d) . (A.7)
Similarly, we obtain with (A.6) and Lemma 2.2c) that C(f˜
[g]
nat, τ
[g],U , d¯) − C(f˜ [g]at , τ [g],U , d¯) ≤
|A| · κ ·
√
|P|·|A|·κ·dmax
T (U ,d) , which together with (A.7) implies Lemma 3.3c). This completes the proof of
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Lemma 3.3. 
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3.4
Let f˜ and f∗ be a non-atomic NE flow and a non-atomic SO flow of the scaled game Γ[g], respectively.
Then ρnat(τ
[g],U , d¯) =
∑
a∈A τ
[g]
a (f˜a)·f˜a∑
a∈A τ
[g]
a (f∗a )·f∗a
. Note that f˜ is an optimal solution of the non-linear program
(NLP) (A.8) below,
min Φ(f) :=
∑
a∈A
∫ fa
0
τ [g]a (x)dx
s.t.
∑
p∈Pk
fp = d¯k =
∑
i∈Uk
dk,i
T (D, d)
=
dk
T (U , d) ∀k ∈ K,
fp ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ P,
(A.8)
see, e.g., [37, 39]. So Φ(f˜) ≤ Φ(f∗).
As the scaled cost fuctions τ
[g]
a (·) have the form (3.2), we obtain that
∫ fa
0
τ [g]a (x)dx =
1
β + 1
· ηa,0 · fβ+1a +
β∑
l=1
ηa,l
(β − l + 1) · T (U , d)l · f
β−l+1
a
=
1
β + 1
· τ [g]a (fa) · fa +
β∑
l=1
l · ηa,l
(β − l + 1) · (β + 1) · T (U , d)l · f
β−l+1
a
(A.9)
for all a ∈ A and all fa ∈ [0, 1]. So
0 ≤
∫ fa
0
τ [g]a (x)dx−
1
β + 1
· τ [g]a (fa) · fa ≤
β · ηmax
β + 1
·
β∑
l=1
1
T (U , d)l
for all a ∈ A and all fa ∈ [0, 1]. Here, we employ the convention that
∑β
l=1
1
T (U ,d)l = 0 when β = 0.
We thus obtain that
∑
a∈A
τ [g]a (f˜a) · f˜a ≤ (β + 1) · Φ(f˜) ≤ (β + 1) · Φ(f∗) ≤
∑
a∈A
τ [g]a (f
∗
a ) · f∗a + β · ηmax ·
β∑
l=1
1
T (U , d)l ,
which in turn implies that ρnat(τ
[g],U , d¯) ≤ 1 + β·ηmax·|P|βη0,min ·
∑β
l=1
1
T (U ,d)l . Here, we recall that η0,min =
mina∈A ηa,0 > 0, and that the total cost
∑
a∈A τ
[g]
a (f∗a ) · f∗a is bounded from below by η0,min|P|β . This
completes the proof of Lemma 3.4. 
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3.5
When β = 0, then the scaled cost functions τ
[g]
a (·) are positive constants, and Lemma 3.5a)–c) hold
trivially. We thus assume β > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3.5a):
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We first bound |EΠ˜(τa(f˜ [g]ran,a))− τa
(
EΠ˜(f˜
[g]
ran,a)
)| for all a ∈ A. Then Lemma 3.3a) follows immedi-
ately from the fact that f˜
[g]
ran is a mixed NE flow.
We obtain by (2.3) that an arc a ∈ A has the expected flow value EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran,a) =
∑
i∈Uk,k∈K
dk,i·Π˜i,a
T (U ,d)
and the variance VARΠ˜(f˜
[g]
ran,a) =
∑
i∈Uk,k∈K
d2k,i·Π˜i,a·(1−Π˜i,a)
T (U ,d)2 w.r.t. the mixed profile Π˜. This follows
since Π˜i,a =
∑
p∈Pk :a∈A Π˜i,p is the probability that user i ∈ Uk uses arc a, and since the demand of
user i ∈ Uk is dk,iT (U ,d) in the scaled game Γ[g].
Chebyshev’s inequality, see Lemma A.1b) above, implies for each δ ∈ (0, 12 ) that
PΠ˜
[∣∣f˜ [g]ran,a − EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran,a)∣∣ > ( dmaxT (U , d))δ
]
≤ (T (U , d)
dmax
)2·δ · VARΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran,a)
≤ (T (U , d)
dmax
)2·δ · ∑
i∈Uk,k∈K
d2k,i
4 · T (U , d)2 ≤
1
4
· ( dmax
T (U , d)
)1−2·δ ∀a ∈ A. (A.10)
Here, we used that dmaxT (U ,d) ≥ d¯k,i =
dk,i
T (U ,d) for all i ∈ Uk and all k ∈ K, and that
∑
i∈Uk,k∈K d¯k,i = 1.
(A.10) implies
PΠ˜
[
∀a ∈ A : ∣∣f˜ [g]ran,a − EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran,a)∣∣ ≤ ( dmaxT (U , d))δ
]
≥ 1− |A|
4
·
( dmax
T (U , d)
)1−2·δ
= 1−Pδ , (A.11)
where Pδ :=
|A|
4 ·
(
dmax
T (U ,d)
)1−2·δ
. Consequently,
PΠ˜
[
∀a ∈ A : |τ [g]a (f˜ [g]ran,a)− τ [g]a
(
EΠ˜(f˜
[g]
ran,a)
)| ≤ κ · ( dmax
T (U , d)
)δ] ≥ 1−Pδ, (A.12)
since the scaled cost functions τ
[g]
a (x) are Lipschitz bounded on [0, 1] with the constant κ defined in
Theorem 3.1.
Note that |τ [g]a (f˜ [g]ran,a) − τ [g]a
(
EΠ˜(f˜
[g]
ran,a)
)| ≤ maxa∈Amaxx∈[0,1] τ [g]a (x) ≤ κβ = ∑βl=0 ηmaxT (U ,d)l holds
with probability 1 for all a ∈ A. This, together with (A.12), implies that
|EΠ˜
(
τ [g]a (f˜
[g]
ran,a)
) − τ [g]a (EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran,a))| ≤ EΠ˜(|τ [g]a (f˜ [g]ran,a)− EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran,a)|) ≤ κ · ( dmaxT (U , d))δ +Pδ · κβ
= κ · ( dmax
T (U , d)
)δ
+
|A|
4
· ( dmax
T (U , d)
)1−2·δ · κ
β
∀a ∈ A ∀β ∈ (0, 1). (A.13)
(A.13) uses that the random event “κ · ( dmaxT (U ,d))δ < |τ [g]a (f˜ [g]ran,a) − EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran,a)| ≤ κβ” occurs with a
probability of at most Pδ, which holds since the random event of (A.12) occurs with a probability of
at least 1−Pδ.
Putting δ = 13 in (A.13), we obtain that
|EΠ˜
(
τ [g]a (f˜
[g]
ran,a)
)− τ [g]a (EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran,a))| ≤ κ · ( dmaxT (U , d))1/3 + |A|4 · ( dmaxT (U , d))1/3 · κβ
= κ · (1 + |A|
4 · β
) · ( dmax
T (U , d)
)1/3 ∀a ∈ A. (A.14)
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(A.14) in turn implies that
|EΠ˜
(
τ [g]p (f˜
[g]
ran)
)− τ [g]p (EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran))| ≤ κ · |A| · (1 + |A|4 · β ) · ( dmaxT (U , d))1/3 ∀p ∈ P. (A.15)
This follows since every path uses at most |A| arcs. (A.15) then yields
τ [g]p
(
EΠ˜(f˜
[g]
ran)
) ≤ τ [g]p′ (EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran)) + 2 · κ · |A| · (1 + |A|4 · β ) · ( dmaxT (U , d))1/3 (A.16)
for all k ∈ K, and any two paths p, p′ ∈ K with expected flow value EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran,p) > 0, since f˜ [g]ran is a
mixed NE flow.
(A.16) and an argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 3.3b) yield that the expected non-
atomic flow EΠ˜[f˜
[g]
ran] is an ǫ-approximate non-atomic NE flow with ǫ := 2·|P|·κ·|A|·
(
1+ |A|4·β
)·( dmaxT (U ,d))1/3.
By Lemma 3.2, we obtain further that
|τ [g]a
(
EΠ˜(f˜
[g]
ran,a)
)− τ [g]a (f˜ [g]nat,a)| ≤ κ ·
√
2 · |P| · κ · |A| · (1 + |A|
4 · β
) · ( dmax
T (U , d)
)1/3 ∀a ∈ A, (A.17)
where f˜
[g]
nat is an arbitrary non-atomic NE flow of Γ
[g].
(A.17) and a similar argument to that in proof of Lemma 3.3c) then imply
|C(f˜ [g]nat, τ [g],U , d¯)− C
(
EΠ˜(f˜
[g]
ran), τ
[g],U , d¯)| (A.18)
≤ |A| · κ ·
√
2 · |P| · κ · |A| · (1 + |A|
4 · β
) · ( dmax
T (U , d)
)1/3
+ 2 · |P| · κ · |A| · (1 + |A|
4 · β
) · ( dmax
T (U , d)
)1/3
.
This completes proof of Lemma 3.5a).
Proof of Lemma 3.5b):
We obtain by (A.11) and (A.12) that the random event
∀a ∈ A : |f˜ [g]ran,a · τ [g]a (f˜ [g]ran,a)−EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran,a) · τ [g]a
(
EΠ˜(f˜
[g]
ran,a)
)|
≤(κ+ηmax · β∑
l=0
1
T (U , d)l
) · ( dmax
T (U , d)
)δ (A.19)
occurs with a probability of at least 1−Pδ. Here, we used that Γ[g] has arc flow values in [0, 1], and
that maxa∈Amax[0,1] τ
[g]
a (x) ≤
∑β
l=0
ηmax
T (U ,d)l . Lemma 3.5b) then follows trivially from (A.19).
Proof of Lemma 3.5c):
It follows again from (A.11) that
|EΠ˜
(
f˜ [g]ran,a · τ [g]a (f˜ [g]ran,a)
)−EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran,a) · τ [g]a (EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran,a))|
≤EΠ˜
(∣∣f˜ [g]ran,a · τ [g]a (f˜ [g]ran,a)−EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran,a) · τ [g]a (EΠ˜(f˜ [g]ran,a))∣∣)
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≤ (κ+ ηmax · β∑
l=0
1
T (U , d)l
) · ( dmax
T (U , d)
)δ
+Pδ · ηmax ·
β∑
l=0
1
T (U , d)l (A.20)
=
(
κ+ ηmax ·
β∑
l=0
1
T (U , d)l
) · ( dmax
T (U , d)
)δ
+
|A|
4
· ( dmax
T (U , d)
)1−2·δ · ηmax · β∑
l=0
1
T (U , d)l
for all a ∈ A and all δ ∈ (0, 12). Here, we use that maxa∈Amaxx∈[0,1] x ·τ
[g]
a (x) ≤
∑β
l=0
ηmax
T (U ,d)l , and that
the random event (A.19) occurs with a probability of at least 1−Pδ, and so the complement event of
(A.19) occurs with a probability of at most Pδ. Lemma 3.5c) then follows immediately from (A.20)
when we put δ = 13 .
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.5c) and finishes the proof of Lemma 3.5. 
A.6 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Consider an arbitrary sequence (Sn)n∈N fulfilling properties (S1)–(S4). Let K1 ≺ · · · ≺ Km be the
ordered partition of all regular groups satisfying conditions (AD1)–(AD2). Then Γ decomposes into
the subgames Γ|K1 , . . . ,Γ|Km ,Γ|Kirreg for the sequence (Sn)n∈N, where Kirreg is the set of irregular
groups, i.e., groups k ∈ K with limn→∞ d(n)k ∈ (0,∞). Properties (S3)–(S4) imply that there is at least
one regular group and so m ≥ 1.
We will prove Lemma 4.1 by scaling each of the above regular subgames Γ|Ku independently. To
this end, we define for each u ∈ M = {1, . . . ,m} a scaling factor g(Ku)n := T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))λu ,
where λu := maxk∈Ku minp∈Pk maxa∈p βa ≥ 0, and the constants βa ≥ 0 denote the degrees of the
polynomials τa(·), see (4.1).
For each regular subgame Γ|Ku, we call a path p ∈
⋃
k∈Ku Pk tight if maxa∈p βa ≤ λu, and non-tight
if maxa∈p βa > λu. Clearly, every regular group k ∈ Kreg =
⋃
u∈MKu has at least one tight path.
Moreover, each tight path p ∈ ⋃k∈Ku Pk contains only arcs a ∈ A with βa ≤ λu, while a non-tight
path p′ ∈ ⋃k∈Ku Pk contains at least one arc a ∈ A with βa > λu, for each u ∈ M. These simple
observations will be very helpful in our proof below.
Let f˜
(n,Kl)
nat and f˜
(n,Kirreg)
nat be an arbitrary non-atomic NE flow of the regular subgame Γ|Kl and an
arbitrary non-atomic NE flow of the irregular subgame Γ|Kirreg , respectively, for each l ∈M and each
n ∈ N.
To facilitate our discussion, we assume further that the sequence (Sn)n∈N satisfies properties (S5)–
(S9) below.
(S5) limn→∞ g
(Ku)
n
g
(Kl)
n
∈ [0,∞] exists for any two u, l ∈ M. We then call g(Ku)n and g(Kl)n mutually
comparable.
(S6) limn→∞
f˜
(n)
at|Ku
T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku)) = limn→∞
(
f˜
(n)
at,p
)
p∈Pk,k∈Ku
T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku)) =: f˜
(∞,Ku)
at = (f˜
(∞,Ku)
at,p )p∈Pk,k∈Ku exists for
each u ∈ M. Here, f˜ (n)at|Ku =
(
f˜
(n)
at,p
)
p∈Pk,k∈Ku is the restriction of the atomic NE flow f˜
(n)
at of Γ to
37
the subgame Γ|Ku , which is again an atomic flow of Γ|Ku w.r.t. the user set U (n,Ku) =
⋃
k∈Ku U
(n)
k
and the user demand vector d(n,Ku) = (d(n)k,i )i∈U(n)k ,k∈Ku
.
(S7) limn→∞
f˜
(n,Ku)
nat
T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku)) = limn→∞
(
f˜
(n,Ku)
nat,p
)
p∈Pk,k∈Ku
T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku)) =: f˜
(∞,Ku)
nat = (f˜
(∞,Ku)
nat,p )p∈Pk ,k∈Ku exists for
each u ∈M.
(S8) limn→∞
E
Π˜(n)
(f˜
(n)
ran)|Ku
T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku)) = limn→∞
(
E
Π˜(n)
(f˜
(n)
ran)
)
p∈Pk,k∈Ku
T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku)) =: f˜
(∞,Ku)
exp = (f˜
(∞,Ku)
exp,p )p∈Pk,k∈Ku ex-
ists for each u ∈ M. Here, EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran)|Ku = EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran|Ku) =
(
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran)
)
p∈Pk,k∈Ku denotes the
restriction of the expected flow EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran) = (EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p))p∈P of the mixed NE flow f˜
(n)
ran of Γ
to the subgame Γ|Ku, which is a non-atomic flow of Γ|Ku w.r.t. U (n,Ku) and d(n,Ku).
(S9) limn→∞
d
(n)
k
T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku)) =: d
(∞,Ku)
k ∈ (0, 1] exists for each k ∈ Ku and each u ∈ M. This
actually follows directly from property (S4) and decomposition condition (AD1). Here, d
(n)
k =∑
i∈U(n)k
d
(n)
k,i is the demand of the regular group k ∈ Kreg.
Lemma 4.1 holds for an arbitrary sequence (Sn)n∈N fulfilling (S1)–(S4) if and only if it holds
for an arbitrary sequence (Sn)n∈N satisfying (S1)–(S9). This follows since every infinite subsequence
(Snj )j∈N of an sequence (Sn)n∈N fulfilling (S1)–(S4) contains an infinite subsequence (Snjl )l∈N fulfilling
(S1)–(S9).
We will prove by an induction on u over the set {0, . . . ,m} = {0}⋃M that (Ato-IA1)–(Sto-IA7)
below hold for every u ∈ {0}⋃M. Here, we put K0 := ∅, g(K0)n := 0 and identify Γ|K0 as the empty
subgame and employ the convention that (Ato-IA1)–(Sto-IA7) hold for u = 0.
(Ato-IA1) max
p∈Pk: f˜(n)at,p>0
τp(f˜
(n)
at ) ∈ O
(
maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n
)
for each k ∈ ⋃ul=0Kl = ⋃ul=1Kl, i.e., themost
costly path used by users of the regular subgame Γ|⋃ul=1Kl has a cost of at most O
(
maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n
)
in the atomic NE flow f˜
(n)
at of Γ. Here, Γ|⋃ul=1Kl is the empty subgame when u = 0.
(Ato-IA2) The joint total cost of the subgame Γ|⋃ul=1Kl is Θ
(
maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n · T (U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl))
)
in
f˜
(n)
at , i.e.,
∑u
l=1
∑
p∈∪k∈KlPk f˜
(n)
at,p · τp(f˜ (n)at ) ∈ Θ
(
maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n · T (U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl))
)
.
(Ato-IA3) limn→∞
∑u
l=1
∑
p∈∪k∈Kl
Pk
f˜
(n)
at,p·τp(f˜(n)at )
∑u
l=1 C(f˜
(n,Kl)
nat ,τ,U(n,Kl),d(n,Kl))
= 1. Here, we employ the convention that 00 = 1.
(Sto-IA1) max
p∈Pk: EΠ˜(n) (f˜
(n)
ran,p)>0
τp(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran)) ∈ O
(
maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n
)
for each k ∈ ⋃ul=1Kl, i.e., the
most costly path used by users of the subgame Γ|⋃ul=1Kl has a cost of at most O
(
maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n
)
in the expected flow EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran) of Γ.
(Sto-IA2) The joint total cost of the subgame Γ|⋃ul=1Kl in EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran) is Θ
(
maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n ·T (U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl))
)
,
i.e.,
∑u
l=1
∑
p∈∪k∈KlPk EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p) · τp(EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran)) ∈ Θ
(
maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n · T (U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl))
)
.
(Sto-IA3) limn→∞
∑u
l=1
∑
p∈∪k∈Kl
Pk
E
Π˜(n)
(f˜
(n)
ran,p)·τp
(
E
Π˜(n)
(f˜
(n)
ran)
)
∑u
l=1C(f˜
(n,Kl)
nat ,τ,U(n,Kl),d(n,Kl))
=1.
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(Sto-IA4) max
p∈Pk: EΠ˜(n) (f˜
(n)
ran,p)>0
EΠ˜(n)(τp(f˜
(n)
ran)) ∈ O
(
maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n
)
for each k ∈ ⋃ul=1Kl.
(Sto-IA5)
∑u
l=1
∑
p∈∪k∈KlPk EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p · τp(f˜ (n)ran)) ∈ Θ
(
maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n · T (U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl))
)
.
(Sto-IA6) limn→∞
∑u
l=1
∑
p∈∪k∈Kl
Pk
E
Π˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,p·τp(f˜(n)ran)
)
∑u
l=1 C(f˜
(n,Kl)
nat ,τ,U(n,Kl),d(n,Kl))
=1.
(Sto-IA7) max
p∈Pk: EΠ˜(n) (f˜
(n)
ran,p)>0
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p · τp(f˜ (n)ran)) ∈ O
(
T (U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl)) ·maxll′=0 g(Kl′ )n
)
for
each k ∈ Kl and each l = 0, . . . , u.
(Ato-IA3), (Sto-IA3) and (Sto-IA6) are the most crucial. We obtain trivially that
lim
n→∞
∑m
l=1
∑
p∈⋃k∈Kl Pk
f˜
(n)
at,p · τp(f˜ (n)at )∑m
l=1 C(f˜
(n,Ku)
nat , τ,U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))
=1, (A.21)
lim
n→∞
∑m
l=1
∑
p∈⋃k∈KlPk
EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,p
)·τp(EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran))∑m
l=1C(f˜
(n,Ku)
nat , τ,U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))
=1, (A.22)
lim
n→∞
∑m
l=1
∑
p∈⋃k∈Kl Pk
EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,p · τp(f˜ (n)ran)
)
∑m
l=1C(f˜
(n,Kl)
nat , τ,U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl))
=1, (A.23)
when (Ato-IA3), (Sto-IA3) and (Sto-IA6) hold for all u ∈ M = {1, . . . ,m}. Then Lemma 4.1 follows
immediately from (A.21)–(A.23), since the numerators of fractions in (A.21)–(A.23) are the joint total
cost of the subgame Γ|K\Kirreg in the atomic NE flow f˜
(n)
at , the expected flow EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran) and the mixed
NE flow f˜
(n)
ran, respectively, and since the subgame Γ|Kirreg has a bounded total demand and thus can
be neglected in the limits by an argument similar to that in the proof of Claim A.2 below.
Moreover, (Sto-IA4) implies both (Sto-IA1) and (Sto-IA7). This follows since the random event
“f˜
(n)
ran,p ≤ T (U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl))” occurs almost surely for each p ∈
⋃
k∈Kl Pk and each l ∈ M, since
τp(f˜
(n)
ran) =
∑
a∈A:a∈p τa(f˜
(n)
ran,a) for each p ∈ P, and since the cost functions τa(·) are convex and so
EΠ˜(n)(τa(f˜
(n)
ran,a)) ≥ τa(EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,a)) for all a ∈ A, see Jensen’s inequality in Lemma A.1c).
Consider now an arbitrary u ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} such that (Ato-IA1)–(Sto-IA7) hold for each non-
negative integer l ≤ u. We will prove (Ato-IA1)–(Sto-IA7) for u+ 1. This then implies (A.21)–(A.23)
by induction.
For each k ∈ Ku+1 and each p ∈ Pk, EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,p) = 0 implies that Π˜(n)i,p = 0 for every user
i ∈ U (n)k because of (2.2). So, for each p ∈ Pk, EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,p) = 0 is equivalent to the fact that
the random event “f˜
(n)
ran,p = 0” occurs almost surely, i.e., PΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p = 0) = 1. Similarly, for each
a ∈ A, EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,a|⋃ul=1Kl) = 0 is equivalent to the fact that the random event “f˜
(n)
ran,a|⋃ul=1Kl = 0”
occurs almost surely. Therefore, we can directly remove f˜
(n)
ran,a|⋃ul=1Kl from the expectation of the
random variables τa(f˜
(n)
ran,a) and f˜
(n)
ran,a · τa(f˜ (n)ran,a) when EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,a|⋃ul=1Kl) = 0. Here, we recall that
f˜
(n)
ran,a|⋃ul=1Kl =
∑u
l=1
∑
p∈∪k∈KlPk:a∈p f˜
(n)
ran,p is the contribution of the subgame Γ|∪ul=1Kl to the arc flow
value f˜
(n)
ran,a, and that users choose an arc a ∈ A w.r.t. mixed profile Π˜(n) mutually independently.
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With the above observations and the inductive assumptions (Ato-IA1), (Sto-IA1) and (Sto-IA4)
of step u, we obtain (A.24)–(A.27) below for every arc a ∈ A and every path p ∈ ⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk.
(A.24) follows since (Ato-IA1) holds in step u, and the fact that f˜
(n)
at,a|⋃ul=1Kl > 0 implies that
a ∈ p for some path p ∈ ⋃ul=1⋃k∈Kl Pk with f˜ (n)at,p > 0. (A.25)–(A.26) can be justified similarly since
(Sto-IA1) and (Sto-IA4) hold in step u. (A.27) follows immediately from (A.26) and the fact that
f˜
(n)
ran,p ≤ T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) for every path p ∈
⋃
k∈Ku+1 Pk. Here, we observe that (A.24)–(A.27)
hold trivially when u = 0, i.e.,
⋃u
l=1Kl = ∅.
τa(f˜
(n)
at,a) = τa(f˜
(n)
at,a|⋃ul=1Kl + f˜
(n)
at,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl) =


O
(
maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n
)
if f˜
(n)
at,a|⋃ul=1Kl > 0,
τa(f˜
(n)
at,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl) if f˜
(n)
at,a|⋃ul=1Kl = 0,
(A.24)
τa
(
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a)
)
= τa
(
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|⋃ul=1Kl) + EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl)
)
=


O
(
maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n
)
if EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|⋃ul=1Kl) > 0,
τa
(
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl)
)
if EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|⋃ul=1Kl) = 0,
(A.25)
EΠ˜(n)
(
τa(f˜
(n)
ran,a)
)
= EΠ˜(n)
(
τa(f˜
(n)
ran,a|⋃ul=1Kl + f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl)
)
=


O(maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n ) if EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,a|⋃ul=1Kl
)
> 0,
EΠ˜(n)
(
τa(f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl)
)
if EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,a|⋃ul=1Kl
)
= 0,
(A.26)
EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜ (n)ran,p · τa(f˜ (n)ran,a)
)
= EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜ (n)ran,p · τa(f˜ (n)ran,a|⋃ul=1Kl + f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl)
)
=


O
(
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) ·maxul=0 g(Kl)n
)
if EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|⋃ul=1Kl) > 0,
EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,p · τa(f˜ (n)ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl)
)
if EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|⋃ul=1Kl) = 0.
(A.27)
With (A.24)–(A.26), we now show (Ato-IA1), (Sto-IA1), (Sto-IA4) and (Sto-IA7) for step u+ 1.
Claim A.1. (Ato-IA1), (Sto-IA1), (Sto-IA4) and (Sto-IA7) hold for step u+ 1.
Proof of Claim A.1: We only need to show (Ato-IA1) and (Sto-IA4), as (Sto-IA4) implies
(Sto-IA1) and (Sto-IA7).
(Ato-IA1): We obtain by (A.24) that τa(f˜
(n)
at,a) ∈ O
(
maxu+1l=0 g
(Kl)
n
)
for every arc a ∈ A with
βa ≤ λu+1, since
f˜
(n)
at,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl ∈ O(T (U
(n,K\∪ul=1Kl), d(n,K\∪
u
l=1Kl))) ⊆ O(T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1))),
g
(Ku+1)
n = T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1))λu+1 , and (4.4) holds. Then every tight path p ∈
⋃
k∈Ku+1 Pk has a
cost of τp(f˜
(n)
at ) ∈ O(maxu+1l=0 g(Kl)n ), since every arc a ∈ p has a cost function with degree βa ≤ λu+1
when p is tight. So max
p∈Pk:f˜(n)at,p>0
τp(f˜
(n)
at ) ∈ O(maxu+1l=0 g(Kl)n ) for each k ∈ Ku+1. This follows since
every O/D pair (ok, tk) ∈ Ku+1 has at least one tight path, since f˜ (n)at is an atomic NE flow, and
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since every user of subgame Γ|Ku+1 has a positive bounded demand and thus can decrease its cost by
unilaterally moving to a tight path if it is using a path with a cost of ω(maxu+1l=0 g
(Kl)
n ) (when n is
large). Here, we observe that the cost of a path does not significantly change for large n when we
remove from or add to the path only a bounded amount of demand. This completes the proof of
(Ato-IA1) for step u+ 1.
(Sto-IA4): Similarly, we obtain by (A.26) that EΠ˜(n)(τp(f˜
(n)
ran)) ∈ O(maxu+1l=0 g(Kl)n ) for every tight
path p ∈ ⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk. Then (Sto-IA4) of step u+1 follows immediately from the fact that every group
k ∈ Ku+1 has at least one tight path, since f˜ (n)ran is a mixed NE flow.
This completes the proof of Claim A.1. 
Note that either g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ O(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ) or g(Ku+1)n ∈ ω(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ), since the scaling factors
are mutually comparable, i.e., the sequence (Sn)n∈N satisfies property (S5).
Claim A.2 below shows that (Ato-IA2)–(Ato-IA3), (Sto-IA2)–(Sto-IA3), and (Sto-IA5)–(Sto-IA6)
hold at step u + 1 when g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ O(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ). Then Claim A.1–Claim A.2 together imply
(Ato-IA1)–(Sto-IA7) for step u+ 1 when g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ O(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ). Here, we observe that g(Ku+1)n ∈
O(maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n ) happens only when u > 0, since g
(K0)
n = 0 and g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ Ω(1) for each u ∈ {0, . . . ,m−
1}.
Claim A.2. If g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ O(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ), then (Ato-IA2)–(Ato-IA3), (Sto-IA2)–(Sto-IA3), and
(Sto-IA5)–(Sto-IA6) hold at step u+ 1.
Proof of Claim A.2: (Ato-IA1) of step u+ 1 yields
f˜
(n)
at,p · τp(f˜ (n)at,p) ∈ O
(
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · u+1max
l=0
g(Kl)n
)
= O
(
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · umax
l=0
g(Kl)n
)
for every p ∈ ⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk with f˜ (n)at,p > 0 when g(Ku+1)n ∈ O(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ). This in turn implies that
∑
p∈∪k∈Ku+1Pk
f˜
(n)
at,p ·τp(f˜ (n)at,p) ∈O
(
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1))· umax
l=0
g(Kl)n
)
⊆o( umax
l=0
T (U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl))·g(Kl)n
)
.
(A.28)
Here, we used (4.4). Then (Ato-IA2) of step u+ 1 follows from (Ato-IA2) of step u.
(Ato-IA3) of step u+ 1 then follows from (A.28), (Ato-IA3) of step u, and (A.29) below,
C(f˜
(n,Ku+1)
nat ,τ,U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) ∈Θ(T (U (n,Ku+1),d(n,Ku+1))·g(Ku+1)n )
⊆o( umax
l=0
T (U (n,Kl),d(n,Kl))·g(Kl)n
)
,
(A.29)
see (A.31) of Fact A.1 below.
(A.28)–(A.29) show that the contribution of Γ|Ku+1 to f˜
(n)
at is negligible compared to other subgames
when g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ O(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ). Similarly, we can obtain (Sto-IA2)–(Sto-IA3) and (Sto-IA5)–(Sto-
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IA6) of step u+1 by showing that Γ|Ku+1 is also negligible in both f˜
(n)
ran and EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran) when g
(Ku+1)
n ∈
O(maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n ), where we use (Sto-IA1), (Sto-IA4) and (Sto-IA7) of step u+ 1, respectively.
This completes the proof of Claim A.2. 
We now show that (Ato-IA2)–(Ato-IA3), (Sto-IA2)–(Sto-IA3) and (Sto-IA5)–(Sto-IA6) hold also
for step u+1 when g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ ω(maxul=1 g(Kl)n ). This, together with Claim A.1 and Claim A.2, finishes
the proof of (Ato-IA1)–(Sto-IA7) for step u+ 1.
Fact A.1 below states a helpful result from [43], which shows that the limit f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
nat = limn→∞
f˜
(n,Ku+1)
nat
T (U(n,Ku+1),d(n,Ku+1)) is a non-atomic NE flow of a limit game Γ
(∞)
|Ku+1, and the scaled total cost
C(f˜
(n,Ku+1)
nat ,τ,U(n,Ku+1),d(n,Ku+1))
T (U(n,Ku+1),d(n,Ku+1))·g(Ku+1)n
of subgame Γ|Ku+1 converges to the total cost of f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
nat in Γ
(∞)
|Ku+1. Here, Γ
(∞)
|Ku+1 is a (non-atomic) con-
gestion game with (group) demand vector d(∞,Ku+1) = (d(∞,Ku+1)k )k∈Ku+1 = limn→∞
(d
(n,Ku+1)
k )k∈Ku+1
T (U(n,Ku+1),d(n,Ku+1))
and cost function
τ (∞,Ku+1)a (x) = lim
y→x+
lim
n→∞
τa
(
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · y)
g
(Ku+1)
n
=


∞ if βa > λu+1,
ηa · xβa if βa = λu+1,
0 if βa < λu+1,
(A.30)
for every x ∈ [0, 1] and every arc a ∈ A.
Fact A.1 (See [43]). For each u = {0, . . . ,m− 1} = {0} ∪ (M\ {m}),
lim
n→∞
C(f˜
(n,Ku+1)
nat , τ,U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1))
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= lim
n→∞
∑
k∈Ku+1
∑
p∈Pk
f˜
(n,Ku+1)
nat,p
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) ·
τp(f˜
(n,Ku+1)
nat )
g
(Ku+1)
n
=
∑
a∈A
f
(∞,Ku+1)
nat,a · τ (∞,Ku+1)a (f (∞,Ku+1)nat,a ) ∈ (0,∞) (A.31)
and f
(∞,Ku+1)
nat is a non-atomic NE flow of Γ
(∞)
|Ku+1 s.t. f
(∞,Ku+1)
nat.p = 0 for each non-tight p ∈
⋃
k∈Ku+1 Pk.
Here, we employ the convention that 0 · ∞ = 0.
Properties similar to Fact A.1 carry over to f˜
(n)
at and EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran) when g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ ω(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ).
In fact, (A.24)–(A.25) together imply for an arbitrary a ∈ A that
lim
n→∞
τa(f˜
(n)
at,a)
g
(Ku+1)
n
= lim
n→∞
τa
(
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) ·
f˜
(n)
at,a|
⋃u
l=1
Kl
+f˜
(n)
at,a|Ku+1
+f˜
(n)
at,a|K\
⋃u+1
l=1
Kl
T (U(n,Ku+1),d(n,Ku+1))
)
g
(Ku+1)
n
= τ (∞,Ku+1)a
(
lim
n→∞
f˜
(n)
at,a|Ku+1
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1))
)
= τ (∞,Ku+1)a
(
lim
n→∞
∑
p∈⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk :a∈p
f˜
(n)
at,p
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1))
)
= τ (∞,Ku+1)a
( ∑
p∈⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk :a∈p
f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
at,p
)
= τ (∞,Ku+1)a (f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
at,a ) (A.32)
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when f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
at,a =
∑
p∈⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk :a∈p
f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
at,p > 0 or βa ≤ λu+1, and that
lim
n→∞
τa
(
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a)
)
g
(Ku+1)
n
= τ (∞,Ku+1)a
( ∑
p∈⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk :a∈p
f˜ (∞,Ku+1)exp,p
)
= τ (∞,Ku+1)a (f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
exp,a ), (A.33)
when f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
exp,a =
∑
p∈⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk :a∈p
f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
exp,p > 0 or βa ≤ λu+1.
We justify (A.32)–(A.33) below.
f˜
(n)
at,a|K\∪u+1l=1 Kl
and EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\∪u+1l=1 Kl
)
vanish in the limits of (A.32)–(A.33) since
T (U (n,K\∪u+1l=1Kl), d(n,K\∪u+1l=1Kl))=T (U (n,Kirreg), d(n,Kirreg))+
m∑
l=u+2
T (U (n,Kl), d(n,Kl))∈o(T (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)),
and f˜
(n)
at,a|K\⋃u+1l=1 Kl
, EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\⋃u+1l=1 Kl
) ∈ O(T (U (n,K\∪u+1l=1 Kl), d(n,K\∪u+1l=1 Kl))). Here, we again used
(4.4).
When βa ≥ λu+1 and limj→∞ f˜ (nj)at,a|∪ul=1Kl/T (U
(nj ,Ku+1), d(nj ,Ku+1)) > 0 for an infinite subsequence
(nj)j∈N, then we will obtain both τa(f˜
(nj)
at,a ) ∈ Ω(g(Ku+1)nj ) and f˜ (nj)at,a|∪ul=1Kl ∈ ω(1) for that subse-
quence. This implies by the first case of (A.24) and g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ ω(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ) that f˜ (n)at,a|∪ul=1Kl ∈
o(T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1))) for each arc a ∈ A whose cost function has a degree βa ≥ λu+1. So f˜ (n)at,a|∪ul=1Kl
vanishes in the limit of (A.32) when βa ≥ λu+1 and f˜ (∞,Ku+1)at,a > 0. In particular, this, together with
(A.30), justifies (A.32) when βa = λu+1, regardless of whether f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
at,a > 0 or not in this case.
Consider now that βa < λu+1. We then obtain from (A.24) and g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ ω(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ) that
τa(f˜
(n)
at,a|∪ul=1Kl
) and τa(f˜
(n)
at,a|Ku+1) ∈ o(g
(Ku+1)
n ). So τa(f˜
(n)
at,a) ∈ Θ(max{τa(f˜ (n)at,a|∪ul=1Kl), τa(f˜
(n)
at,a|Ku+1)})
∈ o(g(Ku+1)n ). Then (A.30) yields (A.32) when βa < λu+1, regardless of whether f˜ (∞,Ku+1)at,a > 0 or not.
(A.33) follows with a similar argument. Here, we use the first case of (A.25).
(A.30), (A.32)–(A.33) together imply immediately for each tight path p ∈ ⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk that
lim
n→∞
τp(f˜
(n)
at )
g
(Ku+1)
n
= lim
n→∞
τp(f˜
(n)
at|Ku+1)
g
(Ku+1)
n
= τ (∞,Ku+1)p (f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
at ) ∈ [0,∞),
lim
n→∞
τp(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran))
g
(Ku+1)
n
= lim
n→∞
τp(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran|Ku+1))
g
(Ku+1)
n
= τ (∞,Ku+1)p (f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
exp ) ∈ [0,∞),
(A.34)
since a tight path p ∈ ⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk contains only arcs a ∈ A that have a cost function with degree
βa ≤ λu+1.
With Fact A.1 and (A.34), Claim A.3 below shows (Ato-IA2)–(Ato-IA3) at step u + 1 when
g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ ω(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ). Actually, the proof of Claim A.3 shows that f˜ (∞,Ku+1)at = limn→∞
f˜
(n)
at|Ku+1
T (U(n,Ku+1),d(n,Ku+1))
is also a non-atomic NE flow of Γ
(∞)
|Ku+1 and that non-tight paths can be neglected in the limit, when
g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ ω(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ).
Claim A.3. (Ato-IA2)–(Ato-IA3) hold at step u+ 1 when g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ ω(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ).
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Proof of Claim A.3:
We obtain for every non-tight path p ∈ ⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk that
lim
n→∞
f˜
(n)
at,p
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) = f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
at,p = 0
lim
n→∞
f˜
(n)
at,p
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) ·
τp(f˜
(n)
at )
g
(Ku+1)
n
= lim
n→∞
1(0,∞)(f˜
(n)
at,p) · f˜ (n)at,p
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) ·
τp(f˜
(n)
at )
g
(Ku+1)
n
= 0.
(A.35)
(A.35) follows since a non-tight path p ∈ ⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk has a cost of O(g(Ku+1)n ) = O(maxu+1l=0 g(Kl)n ) if
f˜
(n)
at,p > 0, (see (Ato-IA1) of step u + 1), and since non-tight paths contain at least one arc a ∈ A
with βa > λu+1 and so f˜
(n)
at,p ∈ o(T (D(n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1))). Here, 1B(x) is the indicator function
of the membership relation “x ∈ B”. Therefore, we can ignore non-tight paths completely when
we investigate the limit of the scaled joint total cost of Γ|Ku+1 in f˜
(n)
at w.r.t. the scaling factor
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n .
Consequently, we obtain by (A.34) and (A.35) that f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
at is a non-atomic NE flow of Γ
(∞)
|Ku+1
and has a total cost satisfying (A.36) below,
lim
n→∞
∑
k∈Ku+1
∑
p∈Pk
f˜
(n)
at,p
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) ·
τp(f˜
(n)
at )
g
(Ku+1)
n
(A.36)
= lim
n→∞
∑
k∈Ku+1
∑
p∈Pk:p is tight
f˜
(n)
at,p
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) ·
τp(f˜
(n)
at )
g
(Ku+1)
n
=
∑
a∈A
f
(∞,Ku+1)
at,a · τ (∞,Ku+1)a (f (∞,Ku+1)at,a ),
where we employ again the convention that 0 · ∞ = 0.
The following facts show that f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
at is a non-atomic NE flow of Γ
(∞)
|Ku+1. Every user con-
trols a bounded amount of demand, and f˜
(n)
at is an atomic NE flow, so τ
(∞,Ku+1)
p (f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
at ) =
limn→∞
τp(f˜
(n)
at )
g
(Ku+1)
n
≤ limn→∞ τp′ (f
′(n)
at )
g
(Ku+1)
n
= τ
(∞,Ku+1)
p′ (f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
at ) for each k ∈ Ku+1 and any two tight paths
p, p′ ∈ Pk with f˜ (∞,Ku+1)p > 0. Here, f
′(n)
at denotes an atomic flow of Γ obtained by moving the demand
of one user from p to p′ in f˜ (n)at , which differs only slightly from f˜
(n)
at as every user has a bounded de-
mand. Combined with Fact A.1 and (Ato-IA2)–(Ato-IA3) of u, (A.36) implies (Ato-IA2)–(Ato-IA3)
for step u+ 1.
This completes the proof of Claim A.3. 
We now prove (Sto-IA2)–(Sto-IA3) and (Sto-IA5)–(Sto-IA6) when g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ ω(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ).
This, together with Claim A.1–Claim A.3, complete the whole proof.
To that end, we need Fact A.2 below. We move the long proof of Fact A.2 to Appendix A.7 below.
Fact A.2. Consider an arbitrary a ∈ A, an arbitrary u = {0, . . . ,m − 1}, an arbitrary polynomial
function h(·) with a degree β ≥ 0 and a constant gn := T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1))λ with an arbitrary
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constant exponent λ > 0. Assume that h(x) is non-decreasing on [0,∞). Then
lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)(h(f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\∪ul=1Kl))
gn
= lim
n→∞
h(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\∪ul=1Kl))
gn
∈ [0,∞]
if either of the two limits exist.
Fact A.2 and an argument similar to the proof of Claim A.3 then yield that the limit
f˜ (∞,Ku+1)exp = limn→∞
EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran|Ku+1
)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1))
is also a non-atomic NE flow of Γ
(∞)
|Ku+1 , and that non-tight paths are negligible in the limit. This
together with Fact A.1 implies (Sto-IA2)–(Sto-IA3) for step u+1. Moreover, (Sto-IA5)–(Sto-IA6) for
step u+ 1 can be obtained similarly from Fact A.2. Claim A.4 below confirms this.
Claim A.4. (Sto-IA2)–(Sto-IA3), (Sto-IA5)–(Sto-IA6) hold at step u+1 when g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ ω(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ).
Proof of Claim A.4:
We obtain by (Sto-IA1) of step u+1 that EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,p
) ∈ o(T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1))) for an arbitrary
non-tight path p ∈ ⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk. Otherwise, there is a non-tight path p ∈ ⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk with both
τp(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran)) =
∑
a∈A:a∈p
τa(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a)) ≥
∑
a∈A:a∈p
τa(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p)) ∈ ω(g(Ku+1)n )
and EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,p
) ∈ Ω(T (U (n,Ku+1) , d(n,Ku+1))). This contradicts with (Sto-IA1) of step u + 1, i.e.,
τp′
(
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran)
) ∈ O(g(Ku+1)n ) for every p′ ∈ ⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk with EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,p′) > 0 when g(Ku+1)n ∈
ω(maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n ). Here, we recall again that every non-tight path p ∈
⋃
k∈Ku+1 Pk contains at least one
arc a ∈ A whose cost function has a degree βa > λu+1.
Consequently, we obtain for each non-tight path p ∈ ⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk that
f˜ (∞,Ku+1)exp,p = limn→∞
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) = limn→∞
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p) · 1(0,∞)(EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,p))
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) = 0,
lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) ·
τp
(
EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran
))
g
(Ku+1)
n
= lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p) · 1(0,∞)(EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,p))
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) ·
τp
(
EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran
))
g
(Ku+1)
n
= 0.
(A.37)
Here, we used again (Sto-IA1) of step u+ 1.
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(A.34) and (A.37) together imply that
lim
n→∞
∑
p∈∪k∈Ku+1Pk EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p) · τp(EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran))
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= lim
n→∞
∑
p∈∪k∈Ku+1Pk :p is tight EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p) · τp(EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran|Ku+1))
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
=
∑
a∈A
f (∞,Ku+1)exp,a · τ (∞,Ku+1)a (f (∞,Ku+1)exp,a ),
(A.38)
where we again use the convention that 0 · ∞ = 0. So (Sto-IA2) of step u+ 1 holds.
When λu+1 > 0, then we obtain by Fact A.2 that f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
exp is a non-atomic NE flow of Γ
(∞)
|Ku+1.
This follows since g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ ω(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ) and
τ (∞,Ku+1)p (f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
exp ) = limn→∞
τp(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran|K\⋃ul=1Kl))
g
(Ku+1)
n
= lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)(τp(f˜
(n)
ran|K\⋃ul=1Kl))
g
(Ku+1)
n
= lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)(τp(f˜
(n)
ran))
g
(Ku+1)
n
≤ lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)(τp′(f˜
(n)
ran))
g
(Ku+1)
n
= lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)(τp′(f˜
(n)
ran|K\⋃ul=1Kl))
g
(Ku+1)
n
= lim
n→∞
τp′(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran|K\⋃ul=1Kl))
g
(Ku+1)
n
= τ
(∞,Ku+1)
p′ (f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
exp )
(A.39)
for an arbitrary k ∈ Ku+1 and two arbitrary tight paths p, p′ ∈ Pk with f˜ (∞,Ku+1)exp,p > 0. Here, we
used Fact A.2 to exchange the expectation in (A.39), used (A.34) to obtain the limits in both sides,
and used (A.25)–(A.26) to remove the influence of subgame Γ|⋃ul=1Kl in the limits when g
(Ku+1)
n ∈
ω(maxul=0 g
(Kl)
n ) and the paths p and p′ are tight.
When λu+1 = 0, then every tight path has a constant cost. So (A.39) holds trivially and f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
exp
is also a non-atomic NE flow of Γ|Ku+1 in this case. Here, we recall (A.37), i.e., f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
exp,p > 0 only if
p ∈ ⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk is tight.
The above arguments together with Fact A.1 imply that (Sto-IA3) holds for step u+ 1.
Below we show (Sto-IA5)–(Sto-IA6) for step u+ 1 when g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ ω(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ).
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Fact A.2 implies for each θn ∈ o(T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1))) and each a ∈ A with βa ≤ λu+1 that
lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)
(
(f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\∪ul=1Kl ± θn) · τa(f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\∪ul=1Kl)
)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\∪ul=1Kl
· τa(f˜ (n)ran,a|K\∪ul=1Kl)
)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\∪ul=1Kl
) · τa(EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,a|K\∪ul=1Kl))
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku+1
) · τa(EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,a|Ku+1))
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= f˜ (∞,Ku+1)exp,a · τ (∞,Ku+1)a (f˜ (∞,Ku+1)exp,a ).
(A.40)
Here, we observe that
EΠ˜(n)(θn · τa(f˜ (n)ran,a|K\∪ul=1Kl)) ∈ o(T (U
(n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n ),
as τa(f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\∪ul=1Kl
) ∈ O(g(Ku+1)n ) holds almost surely when βa ≤ λu+1.
Fact A.2, (A.26)–(A.27), g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ ω(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ) and (A.37) together imply for each non-tight
path p ∈ ⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk that
lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,p · τp(f˜ (n)ran)
)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= lim
n→∞
1(0,∞)(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p)) · EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,p · τp(f˜ (n)ran)
)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= lim
n→∞
∑
a∈A:a∈p,βa>λu+1 1(0,∞)(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p)) · EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,p · τa(f˜ (n)ran,a)
)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= lim
n→∞
∑
a∈A:a∈p,βa>λu+1 1(0,∞)(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p)) · EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,p · τa(f˜ (n)ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl)
)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
(A.41)
≤ lim
n→∞
∑
a∈A:a∈p,βa>λu+1 1(0,∞)(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p)) · EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl · τa(f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl)
)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= lim
n→∞
∑
a∈A:a∈p,βa>λu+1 1(0,∞)(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p)) · EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl
) · τa(EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl))
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
≤ lim
n→∞
∑
a∈A:a∈p,βa>λu+1 1(0,∞)(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p)) · EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl
) · τp(EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran))
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= lim
n→∞
∑
a∈A:a∈p,βa>λu+1 1(0,∞)(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p)) · EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku+1
)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · O(1)
= lim
n→∞
∑
a∈A:a∈p,βa>λu+1
∑
p′∈⋃k∈Ku+1Pk :a∈p′
1(0,∞)(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p)) · EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,p′
)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) ·O(1) = 0.
Here, we used that T (U (n,K\∪u+1l=1 Kl), d(n,K\∪u+1l=1 Kl)) ∈ o(T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1))), that EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,p) = 0
implies PΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p·τp(f˜ (n)ran,a) = 0) = 1 for every a ∈ A, that EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,p) > 0 implies τp(EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran)) ∈
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O(g
(Ku+1)
n ), that p′ is non-tight if p′ contains an arc a with βa > λu+1, and that
lim
n→∞
∑
a∈A:a∈p,βa≤λu+1 1(0,∞)(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p)) · EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,p · τa(f˜ (n)ran,a)
)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= lim
n→∞
∑
a∈A:a∈p,βa≤λu+1 1(0,∞)(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p)) · EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,p · τa(f˜ (n)ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl)
)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
≤ lim
n→∞
∑
a∈A:a∈p,βa≤λu+1 1(0,∞)(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p)) · EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,p
) · τa(T (U (n,K\⋃ul=1Kl), d(n,K\⋃ul=1Kl)))
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= lim
n→∞
∑
a∈A:a∈p,βa≤λu+1 1(0,∞)(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p)) · EΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,p
)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) ·O(1) = 0
when p ∈ ⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk is non-tight.
(A.41) means that non-tight paths are also negligible in the limit when we scale the joint (expected)
total cost of the subgame Γ|Ku+1 in the mixed NE flow f˜
(n)
ran with the factor T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) ·
g
(Ku+1)
n .
(A.40)–(A.41), (A.27) and g
(Ku+1)
n ∈ ω(maxul=0 g(Kl)n ) together imply that
lim
n→∞
∑
p∈⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p · τp(f˜ (n)ran))
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= lim
n→∞
∑
p∈⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk:p is tight
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p · τp(f˜ (n)ran|K\⋃ul=1Kl))
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= lim
n→∞
∑
a∈A:βa≤λu+1 EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a| tight p · τa(f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl))
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
= lim
n→∞
∑
a∈A:βa≤λu+1 EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl · τa(f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl))
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
(A.42)
=
∑
a∈A:βa≤λu+1
f˜ (∞,Ku+1)exp,a · τ (∞,Ku+1)a (f˜ (∞,Ku+1)exp,a ) =
∑
a∈A
f˜ (∞,Ku+1)exp,a · τ (∞,Ku+1)a (f˜ (∞,Ku+1)exp,a ),
where we put f˜
(n)
ran,a|tight p :=
∑
p′∈⋃k∈Ku+1Pk:a∈p′,p′ is tight
f˜
(n)
ran,p′ for each a ∈ A with βa ≤ λu+1. We also
used that
f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl−f˜
(n)
ran,a| tight p ≤
∑
p′∈⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk:p′ is non-tight
f˜
(n)
ran,p′ + T (U (n,K\
⋃u+1
l=1 Kl), d(n,K\
⋃u+1
l=1 Kl))
=
∑
p′∈⋃k∈Ku+1 Pk:p′ is non-tight
f˜
(n)
ran,p′ + o(T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1))),
and that
lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p′ · τa(f˜ (n)ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl))
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) · g(Ku+1)n
≤ lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,p′)
T (U (n,Ku+1), d(n,Ku+1)) ·O(1) = 0
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when βa ≤ λu+1 and p′ ∈
⋃
k∈Ku+1 Pk is non-tight. Here, we observe that the random event
“τa(f˜
(n)
ran,a|K\⋃ul=1Kl) ∈ O(g
(Ku+1)
n )” occurs almost surely when βa ≤ λu+1.
(A.42) together with Fact A.1 proves (Sto-IA5)–(Sto-IA6) for step u+1. Note that we have already
shown that f˜
(∞,Ku+1)
exp is a non-atomic NE flow of Γ
(∞)
|Ku+1. This completes the proof of Claim A.4. 
Therefore, (Ato-IA1)–(Sto-IA7) hold for all u ∈ M, which in turn implies Lemma 4.1, since the
subgame Γ|Kirreg can be neglected in the limits. This completes the proof of Lemma 4.1. 
A.7 Proof of Fact A.2
Consider now an arbitrary arc a ∈ A, an arbitrary u ∈ M = {1, . . . ,m}. Let gn = T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))λ
be a factor with an arbitrary exponent λ > 0, and let h : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) be an arbitrary non-decreasing
polynomial function with degree β ≥ 0. To simplify notation, we assume that Ku = K \
⋃u−1
l=1 Kl. The
proof still holds when Ku is replaced by K \
⋃u−1
l=1 Kl, since (4.4) and
lim
n→∞
gn
T (U (n,K\
⋃u−1
l=1 Kl), d(n,K\
⋃u−1
l=1 Kl))λ
= 1.
We assume, w.o.l.g., that the limit
lim
n→∞
h(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku))
gn
∈ [0,∞]
exists.
To prove the Lemma, we need tight probability lower and upper bounds for the random event
|f˜ (n)ran,a|Ku − EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku)| ∈ O(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku)),
for which Markov’s inequality in Lemma A.1a) will be applied.
Note that
f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku =
∑
k∈Ku
∑
i∈U(n)k
d
(n)
k,i · 1pk,i(Π˜(n)i )(a)
is a weighted sum of |U (n,Ku)| mutually independent Bernoulli random variables
1
pk,i(Π˜
(n)
i )
(a), for i ∈ U (n,Ku) = ∪k∈KuU (n)k .
Recall that pk,i(Π˜
(n)
i ) denotes the random path in Pk sampled by user i using the probability distri-
bution Π˜
(n)
i = (Π˜
(n)
i,p )p∈Pk for each k ∈ Ku and i ∈ U (n)k , and that 1B(b) denotes the indicator function
of the membership relation “b ∈ B” for an arbitrary set B and an arbitrary element b.
We first use Markov’s inequality to obtain useful lower and upper probability bounds for a weighted
sum of arbitrary Bernoulli random variables, respectively, in Fact A.3a)–d) below, and then apply them
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to the weighted sum f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku.
Fact A.3. Consider n mutually independent Bernoulli random variables X1, . . . ,Xn with success
probabilities q1, . . . , qn ∈ [0, 1], respectively. Let v1, . . . , vn be non-negative weights, and Yn =
∑n
i=1 vi ·
Xi be the weighted sum of these n random variables. If vi ≤ υ for a constant υ > 0, then the following
probability bounds hold.
a) P
(
Yn ≥ (1 + δ) · E(Yn)
) ≤ e− (δ+1)·E(Yn)v ·( ln(δ+1)− δδ+1) for all δ > 0.
b) P
(
Yn ≤ (1 − δ) · E(Yn)
) ≤ e−
∑n
i=1 vi−(1−δ)·E(Yn)
v
·
(
ln
∑n
i=1 vi−(1−δ)·E(Yn)∑n
i=1
vi−E(Yn)
− δ·E(Yn)∑n
i=1
vi−(1−δ)·E(Yn)
)
for all δ ∈
(0, 1).
c) If limn→∞ E(Yn) = 0 and limn→∞
∑n
i=1 vi > 1, then there is an integer N ∈ N such that P
(
Yn ≥
1 + δ
) ≤ e− δ+1v ·( ln(δ+1)− δδ+1) for all δ > 0 and all n ≥ N.
d) If limn→∞
∑n
i=1
vi
E(Yn)
= 1 and limn→∞
∑n
i=1 vi =∞, then there is an integer N ∈ N such that
P
(
Yn≤(1−δ) · (E(Yn)−c)
) ≤ e−
∑n
i=1 vi−(1−δ)·(E(Yn)−c)
v
·
(
ln
∑n
i=1 vi−(1−δ)·(E(Yn)−c)∑n
i=1
vi−E(Yn)+c
− δ·E(Yn)−δ·c∑n
i=1
vi−(1−δ)·(E(Yn)−c)
)
for all δ ∈ (0, 1), all c ∈ (0, E(Yn)), and all n ≥ N.
Proof of Fact A.3a): Our proof is similar to that for the usual Chernoff bound in, e.g., [22,27].
Using Markov’s inequality and the fact that X1, . . . ,Xn are mutually independent Bernoulli random
variables with success probabilities q1, . . . , qn, we obtain for an arbitrary t > 0 and an arbitrary δ > 0
that
P
(
Yn ≥ (1 + δ) ·E(Yn)
)
= P
(
et·Yn ≥ et·(1+δ)·E(Yn)) ≤ ∏ni=1 E(et·Xi·vi)
et·(1+δ)·E(Yn)
=
∏n
i=1
(
qi · et·vi + (1− qi)
)
et·(1+δ)·E(Yn)
=
∏n
i=1
(
qi · vi · t · et·vi−1t·vi + 1
)
et·(1+δ)·E(Yn)
.
(A.43)
The function e
x−1
x is non-decreasing on (0,∞) and 1 + x ≤ ex holds for all x ∈ [0,∞). So we obtain
by (A.43) that
P
(
Yn≥(1+δ) ·E(Yn)
) ≤∏ni=1
(
qi · vi · t · et·υ−1t·υ +1
)
et·(1+δ)·E(Yn)
≤ e
∑n
i=1 qi·vi· e
t·υ−1
υ
et·(1+δ)·E(Yn)
=eE(Yn)·
(
et·υ−1
υ
−t·(1+δ)
) (A.44)
for all t > 0. (A.44) implies that P
(
Yn ≥ (1 + δ) · E(Yn)
) ≤ e− (δ+1)·E(Yn)v ·( ln(δ+1)− δδ+1) when we put
t = ln(δ+1)v and observe that ln(δ +1)− δδ+1 > 0 for all δ > 0. This completes the proof of Fact A.3a).
Proof of Fact A.3b): Let Zn :=
∑n
i=1 vi ·(1−Xi). Then Zn+Yn =
∑n
i=1 vi and E(Zn)+E(Yn) =
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∑n
i=1(vi · qi + vi · (1− qi)) =
∑n
i=1 vi. Fact A.3a) implies for every δ ∈ (0, 1) that
P
(
Zn ≥ E(Zn) + δ · E(Yn) =
(
1 +
δ · E(Yn)
E(Zn)
) · E(Zn)) ≤ e− E(Zn)+δ·E(Yn)v ·( ln E(Zn)+δ·E(Yn)E(Zn) − δ·E(Yn)E(Zn)+δ·E(Yn)).
Since the random event Zn ≥ E(Zn)+ δ ·E(Yn) is equivalent to the random event Yn ≤ (1− δ) ·E(Yn),
we obtain that
P(Yn ≤ (1− δ) · E(Yn)) ≤ e−
E(Zn)+δ·E(Yn)
v
·
(
ln E(Zn)+δ·E(Yn)
E(Zn)
− δ·E(Yn)
E(Zn)+δ·E(Yn)
)
= e
−
∑n
i=1 vi−(1−δ)·E(Yn)
v
·
(
ln
∑n
i=1 vi−(1−δ)·E(Yn)∑n
i=1
vi−E(Yn)
− δ·E(Yn)∑n
i=1
vi−(1−δ)·E(Yn)
)
∀δ ∈ (0, 1).
(A.45)
(A.45) proves Fact A.3b).
Proof of Fact A.3c): We say that nmutually independent Bernoulli random variablesX ′1, . . . ,X
′
n
with success probabilities q′1, . . . , q
′
n are stochastically larger than X1, . . . ,Xn if q
′
i ≥ qi for each i =
1, . . . , n. Clearly, there are n mutually independent Bernoulli random variables X ′1, . . . ,X
′
n that are
stochastically larger than X1, . . . ,Xn and satisfy E(Y
′
n) = E(
∑n
i=1 vi ·X ′i) =
∑n
i=1 vi · q′i = 1 for each
large enough n. This follows since E(Yn) =
∑n
i=1 vi · qi → 0 as n → ∞, limn→∞
∑
i=1 vi > 1, and
continuous multi-variate function α(x1, . . . , xn) :=
∑n
i=1 vi · (qi+xi) has [E(Yn),
∑n
i=1 vi] as its range
on the compact domain
∏n
i=1[0, 1 − qi] for all n ∈ N.
Fact A.3c) then follows from Fact A.3a), if PΠ˜(n)(Yn ≥ c) ≤ P(Y ′n =
∑n
i=1 vi · X ′i ≥ c) for an
arbitrary constant c ≥ E(Yn) and mutually independent Bernoulli random variables X ′1, . . . ,X ′n that
are stochastically larger than X1, . . . ,Xn.
Consider now an arbitrary constant c ≥ E(Yn) and n arbitrary mutually independent Bernoulli
random variables X ′1, . . . ,X
′
n that are stochastically larger than X1, . . . ,Xn. We prove below that
PΠ˜(n)(Yn ≥ c) ≤ P(Y ′n ≥ c) only for the particular case that q′1 ≥ q1 and q′i = qi for all i = 2, . . . , n.
One can obtain a proof for the general case with a simple induction over {2, . . . , n}.
Note that
P(Y ′n ≥ c) = P
( n∑
i=2
vi ·X ′i ≥ c− v1
) · P(X ′1 = 1) + P(
n∑
i=2
vi ·X ′i ≥ c
) · P(X ′1 = 0)
= P
( n∑
i=2
vi ·X ′i ≥ c− v1
) · (q1 + q′1 − q1) + P( n∑
i=2
vi ·X ′i ≥ c
) · (1− q1 + q1 − q′1)
= P(Yn ≥ c) + (q′1 − q1) ·
(
P
( n∑
i=2
vi ·Xi ≥ c− v1
)− P( n∑
i=2
vi ·Xi ≥ c
))
= P(Yn ≥ c) + (q′1 − q1) · P
(
c >
n∑
i=2
vi ·Xi ≥ c− v1
)
≥ P(Yn ≥ c).
This follows since the Bernoulli random variables Xi and X
′
i can be identified for each i = 2, . . . , n,
as they have the same success probability qi. This completes the proof of Fact A.3c).
Proof of Fact A.3d): Fact A.3d) follows immediately from Fact A.3b) and the fact that there are
51
nmutually independent Bernoulli random variablesX ′1, . . . ,X
′
n such thatX1, . . . ,Xn are stochastically
larger than X ′1, . . . ,X
′
n and E(Y
′
n) = E(Yn)− c for a constant c ∈ (0, E(Yn)).
This completes the proof of Fact A.3. 
The two probability bounds in Fact A.3a) and Fact A.3b) are similar to the Chernoff bounds and
Hoeffding bounds, see, e.g., [17,22,27]. However, a direct application of these known bounds to f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
involves either the number |U (n,Ku)| of users of subgame Γ|Ku, or the minimum individual demand
min
k∈Ku,i∈U(n)k
d
(n)
k,i of its users. Note that this minimum individual demand may vanish quickly as
n → ∞ and so the number |U (n,Ku)| of users need not be in Θ(T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))) in the proof of
Lemma 4.1.
Note also that Fact A.3a) may not apply when EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) ∈ o(1), and Fact A.3b) does not
apply when limn→∞
E
Π˜(n)
(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
)
T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku)) = f˜
(∞,Ku)
exp,a = 1. We will instead apply Fact A.3c)–d), respectively,
in the proof of Fact A.2 in these two cases.
With all the above preparations, we are now ready to prove Fact A.2.
The two limits in Fact A.2 are equal to 0 when λ > β. This follows since both h(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku))
and EΠ˜(n)(h(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku)) are in o(gn) when λ > β.
We thus assume, w.l.o.g., that β ≥ λ > 0 in this proof. Moreover, we assume that limn→∞
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) ∈ [0,∞] exists. Otherwise, we take an arbitrary infinite subsequence (nj)j∈N satisfying
this condition.
We distinguish in this proof four cases below.
Case I: EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) ∈ Θ(1), i.e., limn→∞ EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) ∈ (0,∞).
Let ξ := λ2·β ∈ (0, 1) be a constant. We obtain by Fact A.3a) with δ := T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))ξ that
PΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku ≥ (1 + T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))ξ) · EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku)) ≤ e−ω(
T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku))ξ
υ
).
This in turn implies that
EΠ˜(n)(h(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku)) ≤ e
−ω
(
T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku))ξ
υ
)
· h(T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku)))+
(1− e−ω
(
T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku))ξ
υ
)
) · h((1 + T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))ξ) · EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,a|Ku))
= o(1) + (1− o(1)) ·Θ(h(T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))ξ))
∈ O(T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))ξ·β) ⊆ O(T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))λ/2) = O(√gn) ⊆ o(gn).
So limn→∞
h(E
Π˜(n)
(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
))
gn
= 0 = limn→∞
E
Π˜(n)
(h(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
))
gn
when EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) ∈ Θ(1).
Case II: EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) ∈ o(1), i.e., limn→∞ EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) = 0.
We obtain by Fact A.3c) that
PΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku ≥ 1 + T (U
(n,Ku), d(n,Ku))ξ
) ≤ e−ω(T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku))ξυ ).
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So limn→∞
h(E
Π˜(n)
(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
))
gn
= 0 = limn→∞
E
Π˜(n)
(h(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
))
gn
when EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) ∈ o(1).
Case III: f˜
(∞,Ku)
exp,a = limn→∞
E
Π˜(n)
(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
)
T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku)) = 1
We obtain by Fact A.3d) that
PΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku ≤
(
1− δ) · (EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,a|Ku)−
√
T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku)))) ≤ e−Ω(δ·T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku))),
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is an arbitrary constant and c :=
√
T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku)). Therefore,
EΠ˜(n)(h(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku))
h(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku))
≥(1−e−Ω(δ·T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku)))) ·
h((1−δ) · (EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,a|Ku)−
√
T (U (n,Ku),d(n,Ku))))
h(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku))
.
This implies that limn→∞
E
Π˜(n)
(h(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
))
h(E
Π˜(n)
(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
))
≥ (1 − δ)β by letting n → ∞ on both sides of the above
inequality. So limn→∞
E
Π˜(n)
(h(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
))
h(E
Π˜(n)
(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
))
≥ 1 due to the arbitrary choice of δ ∈ (0, 1). However, on the
other hand,
lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)
(
h(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku)
)
h
(
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku)
) = lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)
(
h(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku)
)
h
(
T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))) · limn→∞ h
(
T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku)))
h
(
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku)
) ≤ 1.
Hence, we have limn→∞
E
Π˜(n)
(h(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
))
h(E
Π˜(n)
(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
))
= 1 when f˜
(∞,Ku)
exp,a = 1. This proves Fact A.2 when f˜
(∞,Ku)
exp,a =
1.
Case IV: f˜
(∞,Ku)
exp,a < 1 and EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) ∈ ω(1). i.e.,
lim
n→∞EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) =∞ and T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))− EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) ∈ Θ(T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))).
Clearly, Fact A.3a)–b) apply in this case. We further distinguish two subcases below.
(Subcase IV-I: h(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku)) ∈ o(gn)) We have EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) ∈ o(T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))λ/β)
in this subcase. We then obtain similarly by Fact A.3a) that EΠ˜(n)(h(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku)) ∈ o(gn). This follows
since
PΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku>δ · T (U
(n,Ku), d(n,Ku))λ/β) ≤ e−Ω(δ·T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku))λ/β)
for all δ > 0 when h(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku)) ∈ o(gn) and EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) ∈ ω(1), and so
lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)(h(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku))
gn
≤ δβ · O(1)
for all δ > 0.
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(Subcase IV-II: h(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku)) ∈ Ω(gn)) We have
EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) ∈ Ω(T (U
(n,Ku), d(n,Ku))λ/β)
in this subcase. We then obtain by Fact A.3a) that
PΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku ≥ EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) + (EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku))
2/3
) ≤ e−Ω((EΠ˜(n) (f˜(n)ran,a|Ku))1/3),
and so
lim
n→∞
EΠ˜(n)(h(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku))
h(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku))
≤ lim
n→∞ e
−Ω((E
Π˜(n)
(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
))1/3) · h(T (U
(n,Ku), d(n,Ku)))
h(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku))
+ lim
n→∞(1− e
−Ω((E
Π˜(n)
(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
))1/3)
) ·
h(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku) + (EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku))
2/3)
h(EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku))
= 1.
Moreover, limn→∞
E
Π˜(n)
(h(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
))
h(E
Π˜(n)
(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku
))
≥ 1 follows from Fact A.3b), since
PΠ˜(n)
(
f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku ≤ (1− δ) · EΠ˜(n)(f˜
(n)
ran,a|Ku)
) ≤ e−Ω(T (U(n,Ku),d(n,Ku)))
for each δ ∈ (0, 1), when T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))− EΠ˜(n)(f˜ (n)ran,a|Ku) ∈ Θ(T (U (n,Ku), d(n,Ku))).
This completes the proof of Fact A.2. 
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